Western Philosophy in Search of Reality: Being and Ignorance in Philosophy of Saiva Siddhanta

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Introduction

In the beginning of western philosophy expressing the experimental spirit of Greek philosophy, Plato defined philosophy as an endeavour to discover the inherent truth of the soul, to extract from the sphere of appearances what points towards the realm of pure ideas. Aristotle changed this approach to a more systematic dissection of the empirical world, based on the science of metaphysics as the most general and refined branch of philosophy, modifying Plato's philosophy to integrate the appearances as taking directly part in the being of a substance - in the form of concrete composites of form and matter.

After the transitional Roman period, in which the growing spirit of metaphysics reached a mystic dimension in the philosophy of Plotine, which made possible the slowly assimilation of Greek philosophy into the form of Christianity, which by its very doctrinary and revelatory nature were suspicious to any form of philosophy, but later eventually incorporated and systemised the Platonic and Aristotetic metaphysics to fit in the Christian doctrines. This somewhat foreign form to Greek philosophy culminated in a grand synthetic philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas in which all areas of human and divine life was included and founded on rational principles.

The anti-metaphysical and anti-scholastic movement has its root in rejection of the feudal and scholastic medieval culture, including the role of the church, and therefore established is new ideas in the rising success of experimental science (itself a product of the organisation of the middle ages), as a realisation of philosophy in the Renaissance which was based on a concept of an all-pervasive being expressing its infiniteness through the vast universe in which a defining centre was nowhere to be found.

This dissolution of the limited earthly realm into the unlimited universe, and the evocation of the mystical power of the new unified sciences gave soon room for its antithesis: A worldview where everything receives its meaning according to the measurement and scope of human knowledge which was to be the guideline for a new bright future. Thus the period of enlightenment and positivism absorbed the unlimited back into a confined space of human standard. While the heightened ideals of enlightenment philosophy soon lost its momentum, its anti-metaphysical ideology even to this day persists through the scattered fragments of modern philosophy; it is one of

the points of this paper to point out its decisive form in Kant's paradigmatic transcendental subjectivism. The insistence on human knowledge as the limit and meaning of reality, found its most radical expression in Kant's belief that the source of reality was to be found in the essence of the individual consciousness.

This way of transcendental thinking was in fact the last philosophical systems which had a full impact of *both* Continental and Anglo-Saxon philosophy. Kant projected human ideas and progress into a general science of epistemology based on the noblest thing a western philosopher can think of: Logical reasoning tied to empirical experience founded in a pure consciousness. This somewhat narrow concept of knowledge was to be defining for the *reality as such*; symptomatically for later modern philosophy it was essentially for Kant to create a suitable basis for scientific knowledge which was absolute certain, well equipped to create a new model of reality which accommodated the new demands to develop a more manageable worldview which should reflect the status and cultural power of science and its seemingly omnipotent product, technology, which in the 20th and 21st century would seem to be unstoppable on its march towards worldwide domination.

Kant's philosophy meant the final excommunication of metaphysics from philosophy - of the concept of being as such - in favour of a scientific schemata of knowledge to which the reality had to conform effecting the later schism between Continental and Anglo-Saxon philosophy which was to be followed by the seemingly unending process of fragmentation of the modern philosophy in a multitude of rebellious trends. This development was close connected to the dissolution of the centrality of being in different approaches to what human knowledge meant, though still with the common foundation of anti-metaphysical ideology, and the implied worship of human knowledge as the measurement of everything there *is*, either in the form of an active consciousness which constitute itself, or in a form of a linguistic subject following the rules of an ideal or pragmatic expression of language.

In this way the modern western philosophy has achieved the *turning away* from metaphysics, only to find what was left of its original task back in the ancient Greece, now in the modern context: Language. This predictable development of a "new" came in various flavours, but whether it was supplemented with a study of psychology, or in a form of idealism, it didn't make any real difference, because the real determinant was conveniently (and reverently) forgotten, as defined by

Plato from the beginning of time: The daring pursuit of knowledge of the highest form of Being. The ethical and intellectual implication for the beings who are *us*, who try to fill the gap created from the *absence* of reality, with whatever is nearest to our likings or demands, according to our needs of the moment derived from natural sciences, economy, politics, technology, etc., etc.

Philosophers wants legitimacy and respectability - and the easiest way to do this is to connect to a successful field of science, which then would lend philosophy some of its glory for a brief period of time. The possibility of metaphysics as a field which transcends the sciences has become impossible in the context of modern western philosophy, which adapted to a reality in which sciences *commands* the philosophy, like they *commands* reality, and not the other way round. The reverse order of this upside down situation would mean that reality provided the foundation of philosophy, and philosophy provided the foundation of science, in the sense of: To give the science their meaning and purpose towards which they have to strife.

So, what is the meaning of describing the deficits of western philosophy, and even making a western concept of metaphysics a leading theme in an analysis of the Indian philosophy of Śaiva Siddhānta so far from the world of western philosophy?

The answer lies in the phenomenon of *absence* in western philosophy; the absence of common goal, of a common direction, and of a necessary common determination to pursue this absent goal; an absence indicated by what was indicated in the beginning of western philosophy. To explore the metaphysics of Siva Siddhanta is to be reminded of the meaning of philosophy which lies in the revealing of a being as something which is *not* created or measured by us; on the contrary, as something we are wholly dependent on, and that we cannot in any way command. From the philosophy of Śaiva Siddhānta we have the opportunity to win this insight, and consequently begin the journey towards formulating a new foundation of philosophy, a new practical application and validation of experience, and to identify our goal with a new determination. Only when the notion of purpose is released then it is possible to look at western philosophy in a new light; therefore the reinstating of metaphysics is a necessary task to revive philosophy as a *meaningful* and *comprehensive* activity.

In terms of western philosophy we can negatively state that the goals pursued by philosophy is *not* to clear up linguistic misconceptions; it is *not* to integrate philosophy in sociology, psychology, etc.; it is *not* based on a general academic curiosity; and it is *not* to reduce reality to a function of our self, whether it is consciousness or language.

My approach is therefore to understand more profoundly what is absent in western philosophical culture. As the foundation of modern philosophy is submerged in ignorance, we may ask: We all live in the same world; how it is possible to understand in these radical different ways? How has this differences come to be?
These questions are connected to the question of being, and further to the question of truth and knowledge. I will in the process of analysing the metaphysics of Śaiva Siddhānta try to give an indication of what is to be learned by the insight in Śaiva Siddhānta seen from a western perspective.

Formulation of the Problem and Scope of this Paper

Revival of metaphysics is urgently needed if we want to retrieve the meaning of philosophy. Reality cannot be measured by human standards, on the contrary, human knowledge and possibilities are founded on something which is beyond our command – something we have to reconsider in a philosophy which is more than just an instrument of special sciences.

This lack of purpose inherent in western philosophy makes the influence of Indian philosophy on western philosophy urgently needed, while the reverse is somewhat doubtful in respect of some kind of gain, with the exception of rare incidents of individual inspired western philosophers. As the understanding of the metaphysics of Śaiva Siddhānta is the key to an understanding of ourselves and our world, I have chosen this as the subject of this paper, with the specific view of extracting what is philosophically important, and to apply this to the situation of western philosophy. The question which is explored in this paper is: *How are we to understand the metaphysics of Śaiva Siddhānta in the light of the present state of western philosophy?*

This question is explored in the following way:
1) In the first part I will perform an analysis of a basic text of Śaiva Siddhānta, that is, the twelve sūtras, to identify points of special interest for this paper.

2) In the second part I will focus on specific concept in order to gain a better understanding in areas of importance for the aim of this paper.
3) In the third part I will interpret the results of the general and specific analysis within the context of western philosophy.

To be able to do this I have to exclude some aspect which is not essential or practicably for the completion of this paper; this means the demarcation of the scope of the subject as *not* including neither the practical means of attaining liberation, nor the practical applications connected to the daily religious practice of devotees. My aim is only to gain a philosophical and metaphysical insight, so I will exclude the religious and practical aspect of Śaiva Siddhānta, well aware of that these modern (western) divisions in philosophical/religious aspects, or the difference of practical/theoretical aspects, are somewhat artificial and aught not to be regarded as meaningful, at least not in the context of Indian philosophy.

This thesis will concentrate on especially two philosophers: Śivagrayogin and Śivajñānamunivar with the emphasis on the last mentioned. Western philosophy will be included in aspect of relevance, and especially Kant, Husserl and Heidegger will be referred to when an interpretation is necessary. This aspect is *not* to be regarded as a comparative analysis, as this task is complete different from my purpose of interpretation and employing the concept of metaphysics to restore questions out of focus in modern philosophy. This method and aim is beyond the concept of comparative analysis which is an 'objectively' and thoroughly systematic walkthrough of differences and similarities of two systems of philosophy.

Initial Clarification of the Method

The analysis and clearifications are central to this paper, but we need specifically to consider the switch of context especially evident in third part, the interpretation, in which we try to grasp the meaning of being, a definition only applicable to western philosophy. I will therefore examine the definition of metaphysics by Aristotle to get a basis for my analysis of the concept of being in the philosophy of Śaiva Siddhānta; we need, though, an additional instrument to perform the

interpretative step, and for this purpose I have chosen to follow the method of Martin Heidegger as the additional interpretation of being and beings[1].

The inherent absence of aim and common ground in western philosophy, the need for a genuine metaphysic vision and practical verification, and indeed a final purpose of philosophy and philosophical activity, makes itself felt across both analytical and pragmatically philosophy, as well as the continental tradition. To make a connection between Indian and western context an interpretative method is necessary needed, to explain the *meaning* of being as opposed a trivial comparison of similarities in the translation of Tamil or Sanskrit sources and the western philosophical concepts: The *meaning* of how being and beings are presented to us is only accessible through a free interpretation of the *whole* of our worldly horizon in the respect to those specific concepts which is important to the thesis of this paper (the concept of being, world, absence, etc.)

Specifically I will make an attempt to follow important insight derived from the field of phenomenology and hermeneutics, in the sense that I will base my analysis and interpretation of a primary text of Śaiva Siddhānta and its two prominent commentators. I will rely on the combined methods of phenomenology and hermeneutics as they have two essential techniques needed in this paper:

1) Practising a pragmatic version *èpoche* in which all theories and beliefs are withdrawn, to accomplish an understanding which avoids 'natural' prejudices of western philosophy, making the assumptions of this tradition visible. The reductive part of epochè cannot be accomplished to its absolute end, as Husserl intended; it is only applicable as a method to cognise invisible condition of philosophical activities.

2) Interpretation of Śaiva Siddhānta in terms of western philosophical concepts in a *dialogical* fashion: In the meeting of western and Indian philosophy a third dimension is created as the result of both analysis and interpretation, as a progressive understanding of the subject.

In this way I will firstly perform a classical sequential analysis, secondly I will proceed to a more detailed examination of particular concepts, and finally make an interpretation of what has emerged as particular significant for my aim.

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[1] We might understand differently at different times and contexts, but we are still a being which always understands being as such, p.10-15, Heidegger, Martin: "*Sein und Zeit*", Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen (1967)

A Practise of Dying and a Dying Practice

Now the state of western philosophy as an appendix to science leaves the impression of philosophy as an analytical activity subject to the same techniques and progressive development as the science is said to follow. This is a result of ideological self-understanding of modern western culture which in the midst of the apparently success of application of scientific results to technological advances, has become the foundation of economic and military power of dominant western countries. This self-understanding is in direct opposition to the aim of ancient philosophy as can possible be imagined: The contemporary state of western philosophy has irrevocable turned against its origin in the same way that objects in a museum is admired by those who are separated from their past and only wants to experience the chill of foreign symbols in a secure and comfortable environment.

We are reminded of the seriousness of philosophical activity from a time where the innocence of the philosophy was still intact, and where philosophers put their life at risk for the experience of the ideal truth.

One of the dialogues of Plato, *Phaedo*, deals with the last hours of Socrates before his execution in the city of Athens, in year 399 BCE. Here Socrates engages in a discussion of the meaning of death, and he determines this to be the separation of the soul from the body, and states that a philosopher who wants to know the truth must turn away from the body and identify wholly with his soul, because only the soul is capable of knowing the truth, that is, if it is not prevented by the bodily deceptions in the form of desire and pain[2].

The activity of a true philosopher is therefore only to *anticipate* the condition in which the soul is liberated from the body, thereby removing the obstacles to cognising everything as it truly *is*; the true philosopher must long for death, and his special activity which differentiates it from every other activity, is to practice the state of death[3].

This practice is the souls striving towards what he ideally already knows from the previous uncovered state of the soul, a release of what is already there waiting to be uncovered by the philosopher who gains the final liberation from the body and the gross world to be united with the highest and purest forms of real existence, the One which is *beauty*, *goodness* and *truth*.

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[2] p.31, Plato: "*Faidon*", Det Lille Forlag, Frederiksberg (2001).
[3] p.35, Plato: "*Faidon*", (2001).

This pure cognition is an intuitive vision of what is on par with the soul, that which is pure being – and this can only be done in embracing death as part as that true Being[4].

The eternal, ideal and true, is the Primal Being which holds everything else in the descending forms of being, and the movement of the soul from the realm of self-interests and desires towards being is motivated by the natural attraction of entities which possesses the same purity as essence, which is able to cut through the world of phenomenon for those who has practiced their true abilities.

With these thoughts in his mind Socrates is able to submit to the demands of the authorities and empty the prepared cup of poison confident that what he will experience the full cognition of what has only been partly revealed in the state of the world of philosophy.

Śaiva Siddhānta as a Distinct Philosophy within Indian Philosophy

Here I will draw attention to some salient features of the school of Śaiva Siddhānta, and especially the distinguished role of *āṇava maḷa* in this system of thought.
One way to view a philosophy is to review it in its scriptural context, so as to focus on its basic scriptures which form the philosophical foundation[5]. This will bypass the more complex question of the origin and form of practice, but for our purpose the scriptural approach will be most suitable, as the metaphysical implication is about what is stated as opposed to what is performed or showed.

The oldest source available is *Śaivāgamas* which were written in Sanskrit and not distinctly Śaiva Siddhantic, was regarded by Śaiva devotees as possessing at least as much authoritativeness as the *Vedas*. The *Āgama* literature was connected to the worship of Viṣṇu, Śiva and Śakta, of which the *Śaivāgamas* accounted for twenty-eight in numbers, divided in 'higher' and 'lower' portions. The *Śaivāgamas*, which may go back to Buddha's time, pointed to a path leading to a mystical experience through devotion to the ultimate Śiva. In the *Śaivāgamas* it is stated that it is Śiva who

[4] p. 54-56, Plato: "*Faidon*", (2001).
[5] These views are based on p.1-29, Schomerus, H.W.: "*Śaiva Siddhānta – An Indian School of Mystical Thought*", Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi, (2000), and p.30-39, Sivaraman, K: "*Saivism in Philosophical Perspective*", Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi (2001).

revealed the Vedas, it is Śiva who is the ultimate being, and that the creation is in some sense real, and that the three fundamental kind of substances are God, the selves, and the world.

The *Śaivāgamas* was the main source of inspiration for one of the oldest distinctly Śaiva Siddhanta sources, *Tirumantram* by Tirumūlār which may go back as far as the first century but is survived only as a part of a much later compilation of Nambi. *Tirumantram* is a part of the canonical literature of Śaiva Siddhānta, with both a devotional and philosophical aspect.

The compilation of Nambi from the tenth century also contains hymns of a number of Śaiva saints and biographies of their lives and works. These works can be characterised as devotional literature, as opposed to the later philosophical works, most notably the *Śivajñānabodha* from the thirteenth century. Two important predecessors of *Śivajñānabodha* is *Tiruvundiār* and *Tirukkalitruppadiār* (12. century), though not philosophical in the strict sense, but both influential sources of inspiration to the author of *Śivajñānabodha*.

The early philosophical exposition of Śaiva Siddhānta was inclined to a dualistic perspective in the form of philosophical manuals, most notably king Bhoja of Dhāra (11. century), commented upon by Śrīkumāra and Aghora Śiva (12. century). A rivalling interpretation is the view of Śivādvaita advocated by Śrīkaṇṭha (12. century) in a famous commentary on *Brahmasūtra*.

The most important work, though, which made Śaiva Siddhanta known as a distinct philosophical school is *Śivajñānabodha* by Meykandadeva who lived in the thirteenth century. Śivajñānabodha stand forth as a represent of a development of Śaiva Siddhānta in a non-dualistic framework, as opposed to the earlier phase which belongs to a dualistic view[6], but also defending this position against purely monistic tendencies.

Within Śaivism there are a number of philosophical schools, of which Śaiva Siddhanta is only one. The different schools are dominant in each their geographical domains: Vīrasaivism in central India, Kashmir Saivism in northern India, and Śaiva Siddhanta in southern India. *Śivajñānabodha* is the chief authoritative philosophical writing of Śaiva Siddhanta, and this scripture with its most

[6] p.33, Sivaraman: "*Saivism in Philosophical Perspective*" (2001)

important commentaries defines Śaiva Siddhānta's philosophical position in opposition to other schools within Śaivism and of course schools outside Śaivism: Buddhism, Carvakas or Lokāyatas, Sāṇkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśesika, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta.

As a broad characterisation is can be said that the most authoritative scriptures of Śaiva Siddhanta is The *Vedas*, the twenty-eight *Śaivāgamas*, *Tirumantram*, and *Śivajñānabodha*. While *Vedas* and *Śaivāgamas* is a part of Sanskrit literature, *Tirumantram* is distinctly Tamil, while *Śivajñānabodha* is found in both a Sanskrit and a Tamil version. The difference between these two versions will be commented upon in the first analytical part of this paper.

Meykandadeva's Śivajñānabodha

Śivajñānabodha by Meykandadeva is meant to be an exegetic evaluation of the philosophical content of the *Śaivāgamas*[7]. *Śivajñānabodha* consists of twelve short sūtras, which is said to have their origin in the ancient time of the riśis. In this form the sūtras represents the quintessence of the *Vedas* and *Śaivāgamas*, as it was taught to Meykandadeva who wrote *Śivajñānabodha* in Tamil language and added an illusive commentary to clarify the message. Thus it is regarded by Śaiva Siddhānta to be a divine word heard by Meykandadeva (not memorized or created) which makes this Tamil scripture on the level with the *Vedas* and *Śaivāgamas* as an authoritative source.

Śivajñānabodha is a systematic philosophical account of Sanskrit sūtras in Tamil language, expressing the doctrines of Śaiva Siddhanta, followed by analysis and rational argumentation for the statements. In this way the work deals with the existence and nature of *Pati*, *Paśu* and *Pāśa*, the means of release, and *Paśu* in the liberated state.

Commentators of Śivajñānabodha

Śivajñānabodha is commented upon by several authors, but the most important commentaries is considered to be *Śivajñānasiddhiār* and *Irupāvirupathu* by Arunanti (an immediate disciple of Meykandadeva); *Saṇkalpanirākaranam*, *Śivaprakāśam* and *Pauṣkarabhaāsya* by Umāpati (14. century); *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya*, *Vistarabhāṣya*, and a classical Śaiva Siddhanta manual *Śaivaparibhāsā* by Śivāgrayogin (16. century); and *Sivajñānamāpādiyam* by Śivagnanamunivar (18. century).

[7] p. xiiv, Jayamma:" *The Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya of Śivāgrayogin*" (1993)

The two last mentioned authors criticises the dualism of Aghora Śiva and accepts largely the views of Śrīkaṇṭha against the dualists, but less monistic inclined than Śrīkaṇṭha, therefore also arguing strict monism in Śivādvaita[8], although some differences exist between the two authors, as Śivagrayogin's position is a slightly more strict adhere to monism in comparison to Śivajñānamunivars position.

I have chosen to follow the late 18th century commentator Śivajñānamunivar's *Sivajñānamāpādiyam* which draws heavily on *Śaivāgamas* and earlier commentaries in the refutation of other schools of philosophy, both within and outside the Saiva tradition, *nāstika* as well as *āstika* philosophies.

I intend to supplement the exposition of Śivajñānamunivar with Śivagrayogin's *Saivaparibhāṣā*, *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya* and *Laghuṭīkā*, all of which is written in Sanskrit, as opposed to the tamil scripture *Sivajñānamāpādiyam* by Śivajñānamunivar.

Śivāgrayogin and Śivajñānamunivar

Śivāgrayogin lived in the later part of 16th Century and early years of 17th Century. He wrote two commentaries to *Śivajñānabodha*, a short commentary, *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya*, and a detailed commentary, *Vistarabhāṣya* (*Laghuṭīkā*), and an independent manual of Śaiva Siddhānta doctrines, *Śaivaparibhāsā*.

Śivajñānamunivar, who's life is slightly better documented, is traditionally supposed to have live 1753 – 1785[9]. He was born in Vikramasingapuram near Tirunelveli, with the birth name Mukkajāliṅgar. At an early age he was initiated into *sannyāsa*, and given the name Śivajñānanam (or Mātava Śivajñānayogin, or the more widely used: Śivajñānamunivar). Śivajñānamunivar's writings cover a wide range of subjects: Grammar, translations from Sanskrit, polemical works, devotional works, and commentaries, including the renown commentary to Meykandadeva's *Śivajñānabodha*, named *Sivajñānamāpādiyam*.

Both Śivāgrayogin and Śivajñānamunivar are regarded as authoritative and classical commentators, and both provide elusive explanations of the condensed twelve sūtras of Śivajñānabodha. There are

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[8] See for example seventh sūtra, statement one, p.327-330, Mudaliar, K. Vajravelu: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*", Madurai Kamaraj University, Madurai (1985).

[9] Devasenapathi, V.A.: "*Śivajñānayogin*", p.1-21, in Indian Philosophical Annual, Balasubramanian, R. (ed.), vol. nineteen, University of Madras (1986-1987)

however some differences between the two authors as Śivāgrayogin is holding a slightly more *advaitic* position compared to Śivajñānamunivar more dualistic position[10]. I will mention here the few differences which has a relevance for this paper:

1) Śivāgrayogin holds that Śiva is both the efficient and material cause of the world, while Śivajñānamunivar holds the position that māyā is the material cause. We will follow Śivajñānamunivar's slightly more realistic exposition in *Sivajñānamāpādiyam*. The difference may not be regarded as significant, as Śivajñānamunivar also states that māyā ultimately depends on Śiva as no manifestation is possible without the power of Śiva.

2) In the question of the relation between God and self in the state of liberation, the two authors' way of expressing this condition differs: Śivāgrayogin explains this relation as analogical to that between attribute and substance, that is, an inseparable relation, which he characterised as pure Bliss[11]. Śivajñānamunivar holds that the self has a separate experience of himself as Śiva-centred, as opposed to ego-centred[12].

3) It is a general accepted position of Śaiva Siddhānta to accept only one *pramāna*, but to cover this subject in a detailed way I have only drawn on Śivāgrayogin's position in Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya, as Śivajñānamunivar in Sivajñānamāpādiyam has no independent explanation of this issue[13].

Śivajñānabodha

Śivajñānabodha is structured in a traditional way with a general part and a special part[14]:

Sūtra 1-6 General part

Sūtra 1-3 Proof of existence (*pramānaiyal*)

Sūtra 4-6 Character and nature (*slakhanaiyal*)

Sūtra 7-12 Special part

Sūtra 7-9 Means of liberation (*sadhnaiyal*)

Sūtra 10-12 Fruits of liberation (*payaniyal*)

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[10] Thirugnanasambandhan, P.: "*A Comparative Study of Śivāgrayogi and Śivajñānamunivar*", p.22-31, in Indian Philosophical Annual, Balasubramanian, R. (ed.), vol. nineteen, University of Madras (1986-1987)

[11] p.348-360, Suryanarayana Sastri, S.S. (trans.): "*The Saivaparibhāṣā of Śivāgrayogin*", University of Madras, Madras (1982).

[12] p.375-378, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985)

[13] This observation is supported by Thirugnanasambandhan, see p.105-106, and p.113-114, Thirugnanasambandhan, P.: "*The Bearing of Śaiva Siddhanta Epistomology on its Metaphysics*", p.101-116, in Indian Philosophical Annual, Balasubramanian, R. (ed.), vol. fourteen, University of Madras (1980-81)

[14] p.88, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

The general part deals with non-eternal nature while the special part deals with nature of things which are eternal and do not change.

Proof of Existence: General part, Sūtra 1-3

The following is an exposition of the first three sūtras of *Śivajñānabodha*, with special focus on the concept of the Supreme Lord, *Pati*, including the proof of existence and nature of *Pati*[15].
Sūtra 1-3 is the so called 'existence sūtras' about world and God as part of the general exposition.

Sūtra 1

The full translation of the first sūtra is following according to textbook:

> "The world which is of the form, he, she and it, is subject to the three operations and hence it is an entity produced. Because of impurity it comes into Being from the agent of dissolution. So the wise say that the end alone is the beginning."[16]

This sūtra can be paraphrased in a way to be divided into 3 topics or statements (adhikaranas)[17]:
1) The universe is subject to three changes
2) The world is an entity produced by an agent, and it issues forth from the agent of dissolution
3) The agent of dissolution alone is primal source.
Strictly speaking the second statement entails two propositions, but traditionally it is treated as one, because the concept of an agent implies some qualification of this agent which is regarded as an inherent and necessary truth.
These statements which Śivajñānamunivar makes use of supports a systematization of the content of the sūtra. This allows several scholastic point of discussion to be brought to the readers attention: 1) Affirmation of the relevant subject, 2) possible points of doubts to be raised, 3) any significant objection from opposing views to be inferred and the subsequent refutation of these, 4) the establishment of the truth, and 5) the final relevance to the unity of thought, that is, its alignment to the wider context of the work.

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[15] This and the following chapters will mainly draw on Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985), and Jayammal: "*Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya of Śivāgrayogin*" (1993)
[16] p.88, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
[17] p.92-124, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

I will briefly mention the individual statements line of reason, but omit some of the detailed argumentation against other schools and the scriptural references in the commentary in *Māpādiyam*.

Statement 1: The universe is subject to three changes

It is held that the universe as a whole with everything in it is an insentient entity (object), and therefore is subject to the three changes of origination, development and decay.[18] This means that the universe has constituent parts, that is, is inert and manifold. Three changes must apply for all individual existent things as well as for the universe as a whole. Śivajñānamunivar states that the arguments concerning objectification of things as something having qualities, and is subject to changes, can be applied to the world of words also, referring to the gender of masculine, feminine or neuter nouns.[19] Śivagrayogin further points out the intimate relationship between words, nouns, and existent objects, arguing that entities like objects has similar attributes as nouns, and that they share the fundamental principal of male, female and neuter principles.[20] Things are not to be separated from language because they share the same attributes. The expression "having parts" means that which is male, female or neuter, and what is denoted as any of the three genders must be an object which is a part of the world. Word and object are two sides of the same coin, partaking in the same reality, subject to the three changes of appearances.

Statement 2: The world is an entity produced by an agent, and it issues forth from the agent of dissolution

This statement consists of two parts: Firstly the world as an entity produced by an agent, and secondly that this agent must be an agent of dissolution.[21] That these two parts belong together is shown by the analysis of what a produced entity is. The first statement has demonstrated that the world is subject to the three changes, and this means that the world is an entity in as much as it evolves. Now the task is to demonstrate that this entity is produced, that is, is an effect. The locus of this argumentation is the theory of causation known as *satkāryavāda* which is presupposed in Meykandar's explaining statement: "there is no coming out for a non-entity and there is no activity for an entity without an agent".[22] *Satkāryavāda* means the existence of the effect in the cause prior

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[18] p.92-98, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
[19] p.97, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
[20] p.8-9, Jayamma:" The *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya of Śivāgrayogin*", (1993)
[21] p.98-118, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
[22] p.98, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

to its operation, and by the acceptance of this doctrine regarding the world (*prakṛti*) it follows that everything exists in a potential form in a root cause, as nothing new can manifest in the world due to the preservation of effects in there causes. Or with other words: What is not existent in a potential form in the cause can not manifest.

This means in turn that the manifested world is an effect of prior causes, and that there must be a first root cause as an effect cannot produce itself. The first cause must thus *transcend* the world in order to set it in motion and guide the evolvement of the manifested world. This cannot be done by any of the other substances: The self, or *māyā*, *karma* or *āṇava maḷa*, because they are either connected to the three impurities (as the soul), or inert (as the three impurities) and do not posses the pure intelligibility required to guide the souls to liberation through the worlds evolvement. Only the Supreme Lord, the agent of dissolution, will be able to activate not only the world, but also the two substances *māyā* and *karma maḷa*, to free the souls from *āṇava maḷa's* dominance, the root cause of bondage.

The supreme Lord of dissolution, *Paramaśiva* is the only agent to recreate from what is previously dissolved, as nothing can be created out of nothing. Agencies of preservation and creation (and even the destructive function of Rudra) are related to the world and therefore derivates of the all encompassing and independent agency of dissolution.

With this line of argumentation is the second statement of the first sūtra demonstrated.

Statement 3: The agent of dissolution alone is primal source

This statement is an enforcement and defence of the above mentioned concept of agency of dissolution by *Paramaśiva* [23]. The function of the statement is to negate other suggested possibilities of the nature of the primal cause, ruling out what is not primal, one, sentient, transcendent, independent, free, active and all encompassing cause of the universe. Here it is demonstrated that *āṇava maḷa*, as well as the liberated soul and other deities than *Paramaśiva*, cannot the true first causal agency of the universe.

Sūtra 2

The full translation of the second sūtra is following according to textbook:

[23] p.118-124, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

> "He, being one with selves and other than they, abides in implicit union with his consciousness-force that they experience going and coming, because of the two fold works."[24]

This sūtra gives a definition of the Primal Being, as well of the soul and the world.
The sūtra can be paraphrased in a way to be divided into 4 statements[25]:
1) Being one with souls and other than souls
2) The two-fold (good and bad) works directed by His authority
3) Experiencing death and birth ceaselessly
4) Abiding in implicit union with His authority
These four statements will be treated below in detail to bring forth the meaning of the sūtra and the significant concepts, defining the characteristics of Śaiva Siddhānta.

Statement 1: Being one with souls and other than souls

This statement describes the relation of the Primal Being with the souls, saying that He is both identical and different from them[26]. This relation has implication, not only for the nature of the Primal Being, but also for the nature of the soul and the world, which will be treated in detail in the following statements. "Being one with the souls" means that He pervades the souls and cannot be separated from them; and "other than souls" means that at the same time He transcends them, as He is ever free from darkness and performs the five cosmological function (creation, sustenance, dissolution, obscuration and salvation).
Although the souls share the *same* essential quality of sentience as the Primal Being, and also being a substance, eternal and uncreated, the souls stands in relation to darkness, obscuring the absolute cognition of the Primal Being, and thus being in a state of impurity and wholly dependent on the being and activity of the Primal Being.
Therefore the souls are different from the Primal Being, although being in an advaita relation to Him. Though ignorant, the souls pervades the universe, but is pervaded (depending on) by the Primal Being who is not pervaded or dependent on something else. When the souls, by the Grace of

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[24] p.125, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
[25] p.132-246/25, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
[26] p.133-143, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

the Primal Being, is freed of their fetters they will know their true nature as pure light derived by God.

Statement 2: The two-fold works directed by His authority

Having a relation with the souls He wills them to experience the results of their works, which fructifies by the action of His consciousness-force (*Śakti*), which is known as He's Authority. This means that the Lord's *Śakti* is the *instrumental* cause of the world. The works of the selves are also considered as instrumental, but only through the Śakti of the Lord, thereby wholly dependent on it. In contrast, Māyā is stated as the *material* cause of the world and cannot initiate anything by itself as it is inert and insentient.

This second statement of the second sūtra is extensively covered in the *Sivajñānamāpādiyam* because it deals, by implication, with the substance of *Paśa*, that is, the existence and nature of *karma*, *māyā* and *āṇava maḷa*, which I will summarise in the following paragraphs.
The objective of the statement is to refute opponents' view, especially the views of the Mīmāṁsikas, the Sāṅkhyas and the Buddhists, all of which is representing a kind of non-theism.

The nature of Karma maḷa

It is vital for the Saiva Siddhantist to maintain the theistic view against the abovementioned views which consider the law of *karma* to be a 'mechanistic' law, not relying on any Gods guidance. The view of Śaiva Siddhānta is of course the opposite: That karma is constantly relying on the guidance of the Primal Being, the agent of dissolution.

The selves which are in union with the Primal Being, is performing the two-fold work (good and bad deeds), which means the accumulated deeds which has been earned in a number of previous births. This can, according to the Śaiva Siddhānta, only be done by the authority of Primal Being (by His *Śakti*). The reason for this is that the Primal Being is needed for the conditioning (of desire/aversion and defects) of the experiences in their future births. When the existing work is produced and the self enters a body to experience the fruit of these accumulated from previous

works, guidance of God is needed to give the consequences of the deeds in the form of experiences, as the deeds cannot of themselves attach to the doer.[27]
The self is subject to ignorance, and unless the experiences due to it are brought in the form of consciousness by the Lord, the self cannot have the experience of its previous deeds. The coordination of deeds and experiences needs a guidance and support for its function. The ultimate objective of *karma maḷa* is to let the individual self mature and get rid of its imperfections in the state of bondage. This necessity of the guidance of the Primal Being also serves as the foundation of the apodictic character of the moral code of conduct to ensure the appropriate results.

The nature of Māyā

Karma maḷa is thus dependent on the guidance of the Lord, but it must also be viewed as dependent in another sense implicating the existence of *māyā maḷa*, the material cause of the world. The deeds must have a medium to which they are attached, as action must be performed attached to a substance, and this substance must be the world's material cause, *māyā*. The deeds attach to the world, as the result of the deeds in the form of pleasure and pain, and this is only possible through the effects of *māyā*. In this way the existence of *karma* and *māyā* are interlinked as quality to substance.

Māyā maḷa is not to be regarded as *prakṛti* in a Sāṅkhya sense of this world. *Prakṛti* in Śaiva Siddhānta is only the cause of things which is less subtle than itself, but cannot be considered as the ultimate cause of the world, as it itself is considered to be an effect of a more subtle cause. *Māyā* is the ultimate material cause, and as this it comprises much more than the *Sāṅkhya's prakṛti*, being a vital link between the Prima Being and the visible and invisible world of the *guṇas*.

Māyā being the material cause of the world is, like *karma maḷa*, an instrument of the Primal Being for the salvation of the souls. *Āṇava maḷa*, in contrast, is the primal darkness, and has no relation to God. So *māyā maḷa* can be viewed under two aspects:
1) As one of the three *maḷas* subsumed under the concept of *Pāśa*, which means bondage. In this aspect *māyā*, like *karma*, shares a *common* feature with the root-mala, *āṇava maḷa*, namely the obscurance of the true nature of the selves.

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[27] p.145, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

2) As a tool of God to free the selves from the darkness of ignorance. In this aspect it is the *opposite* of the root-*maḷa*, as part of one of Gods cosmic function, His instrument of liberation. *Māyā* and its effects can thus be seen as the embodiment of the Primal Being and the souls.

Being eternal and insentient, māyā is activated and evolves by the force of God only, to perform its role as a tool of the Lord for the salvation of selves (and the medium of the *karma*), by giving the selves the opportunity of (gradual) realising their nature through individual deeds and experiences, thus making their way to luminosity and release.
It may be added that there is no trace of Advaita Vedānta's concept of the illusive *māyā*, as Śaiva Siddhānta understands *māyā* as a real entity evolving through real causes and effects. I will only briefly mention the concept of evolution of *māyā* to show the difference to the Sāṅkhya's view, as Śaiva Siddhānta have to demonstrate the link between a supreme creator and the world, which means that some additional categories have to be explained to correct the self-development of *prakṛti* in the concept of the Sāṅkhya.

Māyā is conceived as an insentient, eternal, material cause of the world, real, subtle, pervaded by the Primal Being, and capable to be used as an instrument for the release of the selves. It has two forms: subtle or *pure* (*suddhamāyā*) and gross or *impure* (*asuddhimāyā*), from which the respective subtle and gross worlds evolves[28]:
A) Evolutes from *pure* Māyā (instruments of God)
From *suddhamāyā* evolves the subtle world which is the medium of the state of the Primal Beings as subtle animation. The effects of *suddhamāyā* is the following:
From the pure *māyā* follow the evolutes of two kinds: The world of speech and meanings, and the world of objects and things. The four kinds of speech which categorises a development from cause to effect, is subtle, gross, impression and expression[29] The world of objects is of two kinds; The five pure evolutes or forms which the Primal Being assumes (*Siva*, *Śakti*, *Sadasiva*, *Isvara*, and pure *Vidyā*), and the five phases (kalās) or functions of the *Śakti* of God (release, installation, wisdom, peace and transcendent), which needs the medium of the pure *māyā*.

B) Evolutes from impure Māyā (instruments of the selves)

[28] p.174-146/4, Mudaliar: "Sivajñānamāpādiyam (1985).
[29] p.177, Mudaliar: "Sivajñānamāpādiyam (1985).

From the impure *māyā* follow the evolutes begins with time (*kāla*) and ends with the grossest elements: Time (*kāla*), order (*niyati*), guidance (*kalā*), truth (*vidyā*) and disposition (*ragha*) – manifesting the precondition of powers resp. of agency, cognition, and conation to the selves. These first five evolutes of the impure *māyā* are the five manifestations which enables the selves to experience in a *general* way. From these follows the five infirmities which *qualifies* the *puruṣa* (*puruṣatattvas*), in order to experience *prakṛti*: Indiscrimination, egoism, longing, desire and aversion. From this follows the root cause of *prakṛti* (*mūlaprakṛti*), and the *prakṛti* itself, including its 24 *tattvas*: *Buddhi*, ego, *manas*, the five sense organs, the five organs of action, the five subtle elements, and the five gross elements.

The important thing to note here is that the *prakṛti* of Sāṅkhya, the root-cause of the world, only appear here as a relatively evolute, because Śaiva Siddhānta do not accept a material cause without a guidance, that is, a more profound cause which explains the role of a Supreme Being. This makes a series of evolutes necessary to make the link between the pure Being and the visible world, that is, the elaborate conception of *Śakti* and the pure and impure *māyā*, which do justice to the question of the divine origin of the world we experience.

The nature of āṇava maḷa

As already mentioned, this is the root-impurity. It means that the selves are related to it in the state of bondage, and that the two other *maḷas* derives their function from it; *māyā* and *karma maḷas* function only for the release of the selves from *āṇava maḷa*. Both *māyā*, *karma* and *āṇava maḷas* are eternal and considered as substances, but only *āṇava maḷa* is unrelated to God. That is why *āṇava maḷa* completely dominates the selves during the dissolvent state of the world where the process of release is paused.

The abovementioned three paragraphs summarises what is comprised in the second sūtras second statement.

Statement 3: Experiencing death and birth ceaselessly

The soul will experience continuance of death and birth ("going and coming")[30]. This statement says that it is the same self which will experience numerous lives, as described in the previous

[30] p.246/4 – 246/11, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

paragraphs, and that, after the state of dissolution, it will be the same individual self that will be restored according to the accumulated *karma* before the dissolution. It is also stated that according to the causal law of *satkaryavāda* (the preservation of the cause in the effect) there must be some common element through different bodies, as there is no possibility of introducing a new existent from non-existence. Furthermore the soul must have a support through which to realise its development towards release. This support of the evolutes is only possible in the world through a series of continual cycles, of dissolution and manifestation, as reflected in the cycles of seasons in nature necessary for the sustenance of life.

Only the mechanism of karma in the medium of *māyā* offers such an evolution which will support the release of the self. The subtle body, which is the support of the pervasive self, will not perish, but gives rise to the gross body which changes through dissolution and manifestation, conditioned by the law of *karma*.

Statement 4: Abiding in implicit union with His authority

The Primal Beings consciousness-force, which is known as He's Authority or *Śakti*, is his power abiding in inseparable relation (*samavāya*) with Him.[31] We are now returned to the question of the nature of the Primal Being and His *Śakti*.

It is stated here that although the concept of *Śakti* or Authority is mentioned, it means that the agency of the five cosmic function of the Primal Being necessarily includes *Śakti*, as Primal Being and His force are substantially one. It is important for the author to stress the oneness of Siva and *Śakti*, to avoid limitation and real distinction in the concept of the Primal Being (with exception of āṇava maḷa, which is non-sentient, and therefore cannot cause a dual conception of God).

It is here maintained that God and his *Śakti* is one (although assuming different forms according to His function) and that this is not contradicted by His abovementioned agency or by the evolutes of *māyā*. The manifestation of agency and the world does not mean to divide God from the active force, as some of the other schools states (as Advaita Vedānta which denies any real activity in God, or some *Śakta*-schools).

Sūtra 3

The full translation of the third sūtra is following according to textbook:

[31] p.246/12-246/25, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

> "The existence of the self as a separate entity follows, as it is said to be not as the body is known to be mind, as the function of all the five senses are known, as there is (a confused) awareness of the dream, as there is no experience and activity in the sleep, as it is known when caused to know and as it functions with the body of māyā as instrument"[32]

Note: The *Laghuṭīkā* Sanskrit version omits the concept of *māyā*, only stating: "there exists the conscious self (aṇu) in the body" [33]. The same applies to the translation of *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya*, but here it is added: "As it become conscious when caused to know" [34]. The omitting of māyā in the Tamil version can be said to be stated with the intention not to cause confusion by using a concept which is the hallmark of Advaita Vedānta, as expressing an illusive power of Brahman covering the true Advaita identity between self and *Brahman*.

In this sūtra the author deals with the existence of the self as a separate entity and a true subject, which is not reducible to any insentient entities or the Primal Being. This is done by further inferential methods, explicitly refuting other schools.

The sūtra implicates eight statements [35]:

1) The self is not inexpressible (*śūnya*)
2) The self is not the effect of the physical body
3) The self is not the effect of the sense organs
4) The self is not the effect of the subtle body
5) The self is not the effect of vital air
6) The self is not the Supreme Being
7) The self is not an aggregate of various factors
8) The self is not the inner organs of cognition[36]

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[32] p.246/25-246/26, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).
[33] p.26, (Part 2: Translation) Ganesa, Dr.T.: "*Śivajñānabodha, with the Laghuṭīkā of Śivāgrayogī*", Śrī Aghoraśivācārya Trust, Chennai (2003)
[34] p.44, Jayamma:"*The Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya of Śivāgrayogin*", (1993)
[35] P.246/27-246/38, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).
[36] Not included in *Sivajñānamāpādiyam*, but mentioned by Śivāgrayogin in Jayamma:" *The Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya of Śivāgrayogin*", (1993)

Thus the definition already stated is strengthened by refutation, thereby introducing negative argumentation, and an argumentation caused by the attack on the Śaiva Siddhānta's view on the self.

In all the statements (except the statement concerning the Supreme Being) a fundamental division in sentience and insentience beings is assumed, and the arguments try to strengthen this division by drawing on empirical observations and their inferential implications.

Statement 1: The self is not inexpressible (śūnya)

This refutation targets the buddhist *śūnyavāda*. It states that by the process of elimination of what the self is *not*, that is, to prove its non-existence as a substantial being, implicitly contains an activity of the Self as conscious. To attempt to prove that the subject is an empty non-existent being proves de facto the opposite.

Statement 2: The self is not the effect of the physical body

This refutation targets the Cārvākyas, the materialists position, that states that the self is an effect of the physical body, gross matter. The awareness of consciousness cannot be the effect of the body (as a mixture of four gross elements), as it is clear that we do not in everyday life-experience identify our sense of agency and subjectivity with our body. We constantly think of our self, and act accordingly, as something different from our body. The experience of "I" is not reducible to a body part or the body as a whole; therefore the body can be said to *belong* to an "I" but *not* identical with it.

Statement 3: The self is not the effect of the sense organs

This refutation targets a modified materialist position *Indriātmavāda*, which argues that the soul is a product of the senses. The sense organs, according to the author, cannot constitute the self, as the individual sense organs only cognises their specific sense objects, so they cannot explain the totality of experiencing objects. The understanding of the world is not divided in specific segments; we cognise our world and our self in an integrated and holistic manner. Furthermore the senses don't have their own purpose, but are instrumental in acquiring sense knowledge for something else.

Statement 4: The self is not the effect of the subtle body

This refutation targets a modified materialist position *Sūkṣmadahatmavāda*, which states that the self is identical with the subtle body. The author replies that the subtle body which are the potential

elements and the inner faculties of a human being (as opposed to the gross elements making up the physical body) cannot be the seat of the self, as the state of dream in which the five senses are suppressed appear confused and blurred for the conscious in the waking state.

As dream is experienced by the subtle body, there would be a perfect continuance of experience through the dream and the waking state, but this is *not* so; the experience of dream in the subtle body, and the recollection of the dream in the physical body, are different owing to the difference in media. We recollect fragments of the dreams in a confused manner very different from the recollection of our previous waking state, prior to the dream, in which our senses and body were active.

Therefore the self is not identical with the subtle body. The real experiencing subject of the dream is different from both the subtle and the gross body which enshrines this other conscious principle which experiences both the dream and the waking state.

Statement 5: The self is not the effect of vital air

In yoga controlling the *prāna* is an important means to silence the thought waves and obtain true knowledge. This refutation targets the position of *Prānātmavāda*, which states that the vital air constitutes the self.

Not so, argues the author; the self cannot be derived by the principle of vital air, the source of respiration, as there is no experience of pleasure or pain or activity, in the state of deep sleep, whereas these things are present in the waking state (due to the gross body). This means that the experiencing principle, the self, must be different that the vital air, which is active equally in sleep and waking state. The vital air is an instrument to the self, in the same way as the subtle and the gross body.

Statement 6: The self is not the Supreme Being

This refutation targets the position of *Vijnānātmavāda* or *Brahmavāda*, held by the Advaitins, which states that Brahman is identical with the self, *ātman*; the two concepts only shows a difference in perspective.

But the author argues that the self cannot be identical with the Absolute Being (although both God and self being sentient) because of the *passive* nature of the self. This means, as stated before, that the self only cognises through the manifestation of the two maḷas, while the absolute being is essential free from this limitation. The Primal Being cannot be in bondage like the self, subject to ignorance and attachment and in need for instruction to be released.

Statement 7: The self is not an aggregate of various factors

This refutation targets the position of *Tattvasaṁugātmavāda*, held by some Buddhist schools, which states that an aggregate of *tattvas* (in Buddhist terms: 5 kinds of *skandas*) constitute the self. But the author argues that the self cannot be an effect of a compound of factors, as these factors are only inert entities subject to the changes of *māyā*, whereas the self is eternal and sentient. Furthermore the constituent entities cannot to be viewed as a whole, but only as an compound of a multiplicity of entities, not displaying the true nature of self as one conscious subject.

Statement 8: The self is not the inner organs of cognition

This refutation targets the *andarakaranāvāda*, which states that the self is constituted by the inner cognitive faculties (*buddhi*, *ahaṁkara*, *manas*).[37] If this was the case then any break in the succession in cognition would mean the discontinuation of the function of the soul (as in sleep or at the destruction of the body). But this momentariness of the soul cannot be applied in the case of experiencing of successive sleep and waking states, or the instinctive knowledge of a small child caused by states which must be a result of knowledge prior to this existence. Furthermore the inner faculties are merely insentient instrument of processing knowledge, depending on the external sense organs.

Character and Nature: General part, Sūtra 4-6

Sūtra 4-6 covers character and nature of resp. *Pāśa*, *Paśu* and *Pati*, thus continuing sūtra 3 which dealt with what the Self or soul is *not*.

Sūtra four

The full translation of the fourth sūtra is following according to textbook:

> "Though the self is not one of the inner sensorial, being devoid of knowledge because of the innate impurities, it is associated with them like a king with his ministers, and have five state of consciousness"[38]

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[37] p.51, Śivāgrayogin in Jayamma:" *The Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya of Śivāgrayogin*" (1993)
[38] p.246/25-245/26, Mudaliar: "Sivajñānamāpādiyam" (1985).

Here in this general part the issues evolve around the self in a state of bondage, *Pāśa*, which is associated with sense organs, and which therefore is capable of being in different stages of consciousness. The sūtra can be divided in 3 statements[39]:

1) The self is not one of the inner sensorial

2) Being devoid of sentiency because of its innate impurity, *āṇava maḷa*, it is associated with them

3) The self has 5 states of consciousness like a king with his ministers

Statement 1: The self is not one of the inner sensorial

This statement is in accordance with the statements in the third sūtra, though, here it is only the inner faculties which is mentioned, as the intention is to make a foundation for the nest statement. The inner faculties will examin, classify, determine a course of action, and know the nature of an external object by the sense perception of the sense organs, but neither of the inner faculties, *citta*[40], *manas*, *ahaṅkara*, and *buddhi*, does not know itself or their function. The self, *ātman*, is different from these; it is sentient, that is, conscious of its objects and conscious that it is conscious. By association it examines, classifies, determines, knows, and experiences pleasure, pain or indifference, according to what form buddhi, intelligence, assumes, as this is the proper object of the self. Because of the insentience of the inner faculties, these cannot be the self, as the self is conscious, self-conscious, and luminous.

Statement 2: Being devoid of sentiency because of its innate impurity the self is associated with them

If the self is consciousness of itself as well as its subordinate instruments, why is it that the self and the world is not transparent to us, thus naturally induce us with the discriminate knowledge? Because of the inherent impurity of the self which makes us know only in connection with objects given to our self by the internal and external instruments. The self only knows in a state of association (*sakala avastha*) with the inner cognitive faculties, because of the innate root *maḷas*, *āṇava maḷa*, with which the self always has been related to. Due to the acquired *maḷas*, *māyā* and

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[39] p.249-279, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

[40] The *Citta* is a examining function, which, caused by a indeterminate perception, makes enquiries and proposal as to the categorisation of the indefinite object caused by the latent impressions in memory. On the basis of this the determination of an object is possible. This process of enquiry (including the function of memory) is attributed to *citta*, thus making it a transformation of the internal organ, *manas*, but still mentioning it as a separate evolvent. As opposed to this opinion, Śivagrayogin held it to be a separate internal organ responsible of residual memory functions, indicated from its separate role in the sleeping state of consciousness, p.222-238, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

karma, our self is associated with inner faculties which cause us to know. The self can only function, in the condition of bondage, in association with the evolutes of *māyā*, in this way piercing the darkness of *āṇava maḷa*; the self is dependent of its instruments to know, and this association and dependency constitutes the five states of consciousness.

The association of self and the inner faculties is therefore (in state of impurity) inseparable, as the self indentifies with the object due to the relation to *āṇava maḷa*. The object-consciousness is a partly pierced ignorance which obscures the absolute consciousness or awareness of the individual selves through its multiple potencies.

This awareness limited by time and space, depends on the reflection of the objects in the intelligence, *buddhi*, to which the self is related intimately as the only source of knowledge of objects, and is a necessary stage in a cognitive evolvement. Due to *āṇava maḷa*, a positive force of darkness, the self is dependent on the forces of the Primal One, *karma* and *māyā maḷa*, to bring it to liberation and recognition of absolute awareness; this is the meaning of the necessity of the association between self and inner faculties. Association means: Inseparable, though destructible, relation, a contact capable of making the identity of the participating entities confused or appearing as the other party. At liberation this association is destroyed, as the relation to the root *maḷa* is also destroyed.

Statement 3: The self has 5 states of consciousness

As a result of the described association the sūtra refers to five states of consciousness: Waking, dreaming, sleeping, the fourth, and beyond the fourth.

These different states make it possible for our self to participate in a cognitive relation constituted by the self and the psycho-physical complex with which it is associated.

a) Waking state (*jāgrat*); in which all inner and outer factors are active, including the sense organs which is responsible for sense data, which therefore is a dominating element in the experience in this state.

b) Dreaming state (*svapna*); in which the senses and the organs of action become inactive. The self experiences are in this state constituted by the activity of the mind, including the memory, which replaces the absence of the sense data caused by external sense objects. The recalling of dreams indicates the presence of the mind (*manas*).

c) Sleeping state (*suṣupti*); in which the self experiences an indeterminate awareness, in the absence of the activity of inner sense data, mind and intellect, but still accompanied by citta and the vital air

functions. This accounts for the lack of recalling this state indicates the absence of mind, while the presence of the indeterminate awareness indicate the presence of the *citta* (unsupported by the mind and intellect, and therefore cut off from connection to the wakeful state).

d) The fourth state (*turīya*) is a state of absence of the function of *citta*, while the function of the vital air is still present.

e) The state beyond the fourth state (*turiyātīta*), even the vital air function is absent. This mystical state is a blissful condition, free from all duality. The self is in a state of isolation with the absence of knowledge, *avidyā*.

These states constitute the state of consciousness in bondage, as every individual state reflects the *tattvas*, evolvents, that the self is associated with. Across all the five states the self is ever present; the different states is only different in respect of the associated tattvas, which is almost absent in the fifth state. The condition of the self is here meant as the isolated state in which the self is viewed in relation to the root *maḷa*. The states of consciousness can be understood in both a descending and ascending order.

Sūtra 5

The full translation of the fifth sūtra is following according to textbook:

> "Though the senses know their objects impelled by the self just dealt with, they do not know either themselves or the self. Similarly the selves know their objects being impelled by the divinity but they do not know either themselves or the divinity. They are like the iron in the presence of the magnet" [41]

Here the relation between the senses and their controlling entity, the self, is described, supported by an argumentative analogy of the relation of the self and the divinity, *Pati*. The sūtra focuses on the dependency of the self on the Primal One, which is immutable. In the previous sūtra the focus was the isolated perspective, that is, the self in association with its inner faculties; this sūtra deals with self in a larger perspective, in the state of bondage as connected to the Primal One and His operative *maḷas* as well.

[41] p.279, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

The self experiences in the five states of consciousness, and this experiencing is not caused by either the evolutes which are insentient and without inner purpose, or the self itself which identifies with the evolutes. The causes of experiences must be caused by something else. This argumentation attaches to the existential proofs in sūtra 1 and 2. The question of material and instrumental cause is taken up in again, in a different perspective.

The sūtra is broken down in 2 statements[42]:

1) The five senses will know their objects with the help of the self

2) The self will know with the help of the primal one, like the iron in the presence of the magnet

Statement 1: The five senses will know their objects with the help of the self

The starting point of this statement is the previous statement regarding the association of the self and the inner faculties. Thus the senses cannot know their objects unless the self identifies with them and examine, wills, knows, etc. the objects. When the self grasps the object it also identifies with this, and in this way the senses know their objects, but only through the necessary activity of association or identification of the self. The self objectifies the object in the mind, as well as of the mind itself. The senses know only their designated objects, but know not themselves or the self which conditions their function.

Statement 2: The self will know with the help of the primal one

The relation of the self and the Primal Being is here posited in analogy to the relation of the senses to the self. It may be asked: Is this statement inconsistent with the previous statement, that the consciousness of the self also comprises self-consciousness, as opposed to the insentient things? No, because this statement is about the self in the state of bondage in which the self is clouded and do not know itself as it really is. Thus the substance of the soul as possessing objectifying potency in relation to the senses, also applies to the changeless Primal Being who possess active powers which are conditions of the power of the self. The senses and the self is similar in respect of ignorance of their own true essence and purpose; the conditioned entity cannot comprehend the conditioning entity as it is not in its nature to know this – in case of the self it is its natural attitude in the state of bandage to be directed towards the world of objects.

The potencies of the Primal One is at work in both the self and the world; the material cause of the world is *māyā*, and the instrumental is *karma maḷa*, thus enabling the Primal One as changeless

[42] p.281-287, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

Being to act in the world. By His potency or *Śakti*, the Primal One pervades the self, making conation, volition and cognition of the self possible, while still being changeless.

Sūtra 6

The full translation of the sixth sūtra is following according to textbook:

> "If the Primal Being is knowable He becomes changing (asat). If He is unknowable He is non-existent. Therefore the truly wise say that He is neither, but is a spiritual Reality, because He is unknowable as well as knowable" [43]

This sūtra is dealing with the nature of *Pati*, the Primal Being. As valid knowledge is connected to being, in the sense that if one knows an object by way of one of the non-defective instruments of valid knowledge, then one also has a true relation to some kind of being. As the subject is of the nature of absolute knowledge, the distinction between relative objectifying knowledge and absolute knowledge beyond the bond of ignorance becomes critical. Another important feature is that the question of truth is defined in a relation to reality, that is, being and non-being.
These issues arise from the previous sūtra, which dealt with the unknowability of Primal Being in the state of bondage. Sūtra six aims at settling this question against the argument of Naiyāyikas which hold the knowability of God to be possible as a positive objectifying knowledge.

The sūtra is divided in 2 statements[44]:
1) The Primal Being is neither knowable nor unknowable (against the Naiyāyikas and Saṅkhya)
2) The Primal Being is sat, spiritual Reality

Statement 1: The Primal Being is neither knowable nor unknowable

This sūtra is argumentative directed against other traditions, in the form of setting up two seemingly contradictive and comprehensive propositions, representing opponent schools. Both the propositions are refuted as their implications lead to obvious absurdities which cannot be held while

[43] p.287, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).
[44] p.291-325, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

maintaining a meaningful position. The author solves the dilemma by holding a position which elevates the issue to a higher level:

"If the Primal Being is knowable He becomes changing or non-being (asat)".

"If He is unknowable He is non-existent"

Both the propositions are unacceptable if the reasoning is valid, that is, the primal cannot be either a non-being (impermanent) nor non-existent (like a hares horn).

The source of this problem lies in the definition of being (*sat*) and non-being (*asat*), and the specific connection of these to the possibility and nature of knowledge.

The Primal Being is:

1) Unknowable as a positive objectifying knowledge, mediated by the sense organs and the intellect, from which the self is able to determine the nature by way of identification. It is therefore not known by way of the two *pramānas*, sense perception or inference, that is, by way of objectifying knowledge.

2) Knowable by way of experiential knowledge or spiritual wisdom induced by the potency of the Primal Being.

The particular proposition directed against the Naiyāyikas is that all sense conditioned knowledge must have as its objects of the nature of impermanence (*asat*), as permanence (*sat*) is not composed of part, do not change, and is not limited by time and space. Therefore what is perceived in perception and inference must by of the nature of impermanence, which rules out any knowledge of the Primal Being. That doesn't make the world unreal, but this concealment and projection is, though real, an expression of ignorance on a metaphysical level, and therefore not of the nature of the eternal pervasive supreme changeless being.

This is directed against the Naiyāyikas who believe in a positive knowledge of God by way of perception and reasoning, and the Sāṇkhyas who hold that the *prakṛti* is a real substance including is evolutes, the manifest world.

We will return to the concept of sat and asat in the following chapters.

Statement 2: The Primal Being is Sat, Spiritual Reality

Under this heading Śivajñānamunivar engage in a detailed discussion regarding the means of knowing the Primal One under the aspect of sat, as well as the nature of this absolute being. To this end is launched an elaborate critic of rivalling schools.

The Primal One is in the sixth sūtra determined as '*citsat*'[45], thus qualifying the Primal Being as Pure Consciousness, which is unknowable to the objectifying knowledge. Viewed as an object, *sat* does not exist, because only *asat* can be perceived by the relative knowledge.
The *sat* aspect, as pure being, is knowable because it is known by spiritual transcendental experience, caused the potency of Primal One which manifest itself to the self in the self. As the self is in a relation of inseparable relation with the Primal Being, the caused transcendental knowledge is also a self-knowledge.
The experimental knowledge is thus beyond the knowledge of perception, inference and pure conceptual knowledge. The power of Siva helps to remove the bondage, the effects of *maḷas* which prevents the self to know itself, and thereby also enables him to know Him directly.

Means of liberation: Special part, Sūtra 7-9

The second part of *Śivajñānabodha* concerns the liberation from the condition in which the self is described in the first general part. The special nature dealt with in this part concerns the true nature which does not change, as opposed to the nature in condition of bondage. The first three sūtras in second part are dealing with the means of liberation, and the second three with the fruits of liberation.

Sūtra 7

The full translation of the seventh sūtra is following according to textbook:

> "In the presence of Sat, all are empty and it knows not. Asat is insentient; so it cannot know. The knower of both is the self which is neither" [46]

Note: In the Sanskrit version of the *Laghuṭīkā* the terms referred to is *cit* and *acit*, not *sat* and *asat*:

> "There is no inert matter [acit] in the presence of consciousness [cit] and these two [cit and acit] do not know each other. He who is the knower of both Śiva and the world is the self different from both" [47]

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[45] p.288, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).
[46] p.325, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

The Sanskrit version of *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya* agrees with this.
Both concepts cit and sat agrees on its object, which is the Primal One, but the meaning is different. This difference can be viewed differently according to point of view; here I will only mention the commentary related to sixth sūtra in which the *cit* was used as qualifying *sat* as pure consciousness, which is unknowable to the objectifying knowledge, while *sat* (the unchanging reality) is the qualified term is restricted in use under aspect of *sat*, because it is experienced as a transcendental experience aided by the guiding power of the Primal One [48]. The aspect of the Primal One is thus dependent on an epistemological category which cannot be ignored in this context. I will return to this issue in the further development of the concepts of *sat* and *asat*.

The sūtra is divided in three statements[49]:
1) *Sat* does not know *asat* as everything is empty in the presence of *sat* (against Śivādvaitins)
2) *Asat* cannot know as it is devoid of sentience
3) The self is neither, knows both, with both and remains in both

Statement 1: Sat does not know asat as everything is empty in the presence of sat

This statement is a delineation of the concept of the Primal Being as *sat*, as opposed to Sivādvaitins which has a monistic view which hold that the three substances *Pati*, *Paśu* and *Pāśa* is different only in respect to qualification, implying that, in view of special nature, there is strictly speaking no other category than *sat*.
This undermines the categories of *Pati*, *Paśu* and *Pāśa* as three different *real* substances, while still holding the pervasive nature of *Pati*, the Primal Being.
The meaning of the statement, according to Śivajñānamunivar, is that the world as impermanent will not show itself as a separate entity[50]. The impermanent being as the world manifest caused by the three *maḷas*, is not, from an absolute viewpoint to be regarded as true being, that is, as a separate, changeless, partless Being, though certainly defined as substance as both *āṇava*, *karma* and *māyā* are uncreated substances, but their manifested effect is only known by the objectifying relative knowledge, and *not* through the absolute knowledge; in which case it cannot be experienced

[47] Part 2: Sanskrit text p.8, translation, p.34, Ganesa: "*Śivajñānabodha, with the Laghuṭīkā of Śivāgrayogī*" (2003), translated to romanized version: "nācit citsannidhau kintu na vittste ubhe mithaḥ | prapañcaśivayorvettā yaḥ sa ātmā tayoḥ pṛthak".
[48] p.288, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).
[49] P.327-335, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).
[50] p.328-329, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

by the Primal One which does not know through the bonds of ignorance; being itself is pervasive and cannot be limited as the self in bondage. Therefore the non-knowledge of *asat* is not a defect of the Primal Being.

Statement 2: Asat cannot know as it is devoid of sentience

This statement is a refutation of the Sāṇkhya view of *prakṛti* and its evolutes, especially *buddhi* which is said to gain a kind of ability to experience in the presence of *puruṣa*. Even if it is debatable that this is the view held by Sāṅkhya, it is still a vital issue to be settled in Śaiva Siddhānta; otherwise the position would collapse and change in a Advaita position where the difference between sentient and non-sentient being would vanish, and the realistic trend would change to a idealistic position. Therefore the evolutes can have no knowledge.

Statement 3: The self is neither, knows both, with both, and remains in both

The issue in this statement is strengthening the metaphysical foundation of the epistomological position as the definition of knowledge and being points to the peculiar being of our self which cannot be reduced to the being of the Primal Being, on account that the being of such a creature as the self can never know the things we actually know.

The knowing of the Primal Being and the self is not identical and therefore two different kinds of beings. This means that we know the world in one kind of knowledge and the Primal Being in another kind of knowledge (released by the Primal Being itself in us). Statement one is radically different from this statement two; making the self the unique being who knows, in two incompatible ways, both the sat and asat, and therefore reflects this in its being, as *sadasat*, both Being and impermanence qua its ambiguous knowledge.

What kind of being can this be? For now the answer will be that it is that kind of being which assumes the nature of entities with which it comes into contact; it seems to be a passive factor in a relation to other kinds of beings. In any case, Śivajñānamunivar denies the possibility of the self being a third kind of entity distinctly apart from *sat* and *asat*. The solution is hinted at, in the remark that the self also knows that it knows the two other kind of entities, and through this is added an important metaphysical feature: That it is a being which essentially is capable of pure

apperception[51]. The self secures its being as its very own; it has it "own-ness" in relation to *sat* and *asat*.

Sūtra 8

The full translation of the eight sūtra is following according to textbook:

> "When, because of the self's meritorious practices, the Primal One enlightens the self, even as a master, 'being reared in association of the savage senses you have forgotten your true state', the self leaves them and attain the feet of Hara in inseparable union" [52]

Note: In the version of *Laghuṭīkā* the term used to designate the condition of the self after being awakened by the *Satguru*, is "non-different" (*ananya*).[53]

In this sūtra the issue is the guiding help provided by the *Satguru* to the self identifying with its senses, causing the self to know the Primal One to realise the state of inseparable union with Him, thus explaining the means, attainment and result of liberation.

The sūtra is divided in four statements [54]:

1) The self is enlightened because of its virtuous life in the past
2) The Primal Being itself appears as the spiritual master
3) The self has forgotten its his greatness because of its association with the savage senses
4) The self leaves the five senses and attains the feet of Hara in inseparable union

Statement 1: The self is enlightened because of its virtuous life in the past

The path to liberation is prepared by the self which has performed penances in previous lives, to bring about a condition which is favourable to liberation. The performed disciplines as preparatory stages to liberation are: *Caryā* (the path of the servant), *Kriyā* (the path of the good son) and *Yoga* (the path of friendship of God) initiated and accomplished as required. These disciplines are

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[51] p.334, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).
[52] p.335, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).
[53] p. Part 2: Sanskritversion p.10, Translation, p.34, Ganesa: "*Śivajñānabodha, with the Laghuṭīkā of Śivāgrayogī*" (2003)
[54] p.337-359, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

conditions only, as the cause of knowledge is the divine grace, the power of Śiva. The removal of the ignorance and attainment of direct perfect knowledge cannot be done by the self alone.

Śivajñānamunivar accentuates that the removal of ignorance is gradual, thus dividing the process in five stages to cover from the first awakening to the attainment of the spiritual knowledge. Above the worldly morally code of conduct are the three disciplines: *Caryā*, *Kriyā* and *Yoga* leading to the presence of *Satguru*. Vedic sacrifice is not one of the duties because sacrifices are done for the self, but all truly good action is done in the name of Śiva. Those of these actions which are performed with the proper initiation is conducive to liberation, and those which is done with true feeling of love is true services for Lord Śiva, and are exercised in the mentioned categories: Caryā, kriyā and yoga. All 3 is forms of worship marks a movement from perceiving the Primal One in the gross form, to more subtle forms, from outer form to inner contemplation, resulting in knowledge of Śiva as *Satcitānanda*, limitless, eternal and omnipresent[55]. When the self is prepared then the Grace of the Lord will make itself felt as a new inner force or guiding principle, *Satguru*, to induce the perfect knowledge (*jñāna*) which leads to liberation.

Statement 2: The Primal Being itself appears as the spiritual master

That self who has been purified by the performed austerities mentioned in the previous statement, has made the condition for the guiding force of the Supreme Lord to manifest as spiritual guru. This guru is the force of the Primal One which only can manifest in pure selves. To the selves in bondage Śiva's power conceals itself in the form of a spiritual master which the self in bondage can understand. According to the level of purity and knowledge tradition divides in three levels: *Sakalas*, *pralayakalas* and *vijṇānakalas*: The self in the state of *sakala* it is under influence of all three *maḷas*, *māyā*, *karma* and *āṇava maḷa*; in the state of *pralayakala* it is under influence of the two, *karma* and *āṇava*; and finally the self in the state of *vijṇānakalas* it is only under influence of *āṇava maḷa*.

The self in the *Sakala*-condition can only understand objects with which they can identity, thus the form of a spiritual master, who will impart the knowledge according to their purity and initiate the candidate as appropriate.

[55] p.343, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

The concept of the descending grace to the self as a condition of absolute knowledge and liberation is absolutely crucial to the philosophy and system of Śaiva Siddhānta, as this is the link between the world of ignorance and the true self which has forgotten its nature from the beginning of time.

Statement 3: The self has forgotten his greatness because of its association with the savage senses

By identifying with the senses and the given object, the true knowledge is not realised until the *Satguru* has guided the self. By way of this knowledge the self knows itself as knowing objects realising the discrimination between its nature and the knowledge of objects displayed in the consciousness, thus identifying with the Primal Being as its true nature. Thus the general nature (objectifying empirical consciousness) will be separated from its special nature (*sat*, *cit*, transcendental consciousness).[56]

Statement: 4: The self leaves the five senses and attains the feet of Hara in inseparable union

When the self-consciousness in the presence of the Primal One shows its sentiency, its divine pervasive nature, to which the senses and their objects have no meaning, will cause the self to realise the inseparable union with the Primal One. The worlds separation is due to the absolute knowledge which knows that even the world was caused by *sat*, the Primal one, and so does not exist as an independent existence to which the self will be able to attach.
On the other hand, if such a separation was done without the descending of the Primal Being, the result would be darkness, as the self was not supported by light but only the root impurity *āṇava maḷa*.

Sūtra 9

The full translation of the ninth sūtra is following according to textbook:

> "See the Lord in consciousness with the wisdom of the Lord, who cannot be seen by the defective eye and bondage, He becomes the cool shade when the bondage is abandoned as the fleeting mirage: Letters five as prescribed will be pondered over" [57]

[56] p.354, Mudaliar: "Sivajñānamāpādiyam" (1985).
[57] p.360, Mudaliar: "Sivajñānamāpādiyam" (1985).

The subject of the sūtra is a continuation of the sixth sūtra, stating that when the self has had the vision (*darśana*) of the Lord in itself through the guided spiritual knowledge of its consciousness, and having abandoned the worldly existence, then the five syllable mantra is to be uttered and meditated upon to be firm established in the truth.

The sūtra is divided in 3 statements[58]:

1) It is possible to discover the Lord in consciousness

2) The Lord becomes the cool shade when the bond is abandoned like the fleeting mirage

3) In the manner prescribed will be pondered over the five syllables

Statement 1: It is possible to discover the Lord in consciousness

Solely by spiritual illumination, caused by Śiva's Grace, and not by means of speech and thought or any objectifying knowledge, the Primal One is *seen* in a divine vision. The self is likened to the eye which can only see objects, but not itself or the self that makes it se; in the same way the self can only grasp objects through the senses, but in the state of bondage cannot grasp its (transcendental self) or the Primal Being which makes the self grasp objects. Therefore the benevolent force of the Primal One causes the self to see itself and the Lord as one, in inseparable union.

Statement 2: The Lord becomes the cool shade when the bond is abandoned like the fleeting mirage

When the impermanence of the world (*asat*) is realised as impermanence, that is, non-being, then only that remains which is permanent: The being of the self pervaded by the absolute being. Then the attachment of the self in bondage to the 'heated' fleeting phenomena of the world will be abandoned for the coolness of the absolute permanence.

The worldly existence, likened to hotness, as the self is bound to the fleeting activities of the three guṇas (bright, aggressive and chaotic qualities), and the painful attachment to them, while the steadiness, infiniteness and permanence of the spiritual vision in comparison is likened to the cool shadow of the Lord. The uniqueness of the experience of the vision makes it appear as indeterminate, as the self has no prior categories to determine the insight. But the only radical

[58] p.363-373, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

different knowledge to object-knowledge is absolute and *direct* knowledge, which makes all relative knowledge disappear as false, because the truth is *everywhere*, whereas relative knowledge is the limited object which is given only in word and perception as that which is outside the self, as 'inner' or 'outer' objects, or categorized as the knower, the known and the knowing. The experience changes the nature of the self as bound, to the nature of the self as infinite and absolute, in union with being.

Statement 3: In the manner prescribed will be pondered over the five syllables

The means of purifying the self by practising the utterance of the five holy syllables is gives here, as conducive to the aim of establishing the self firmly in *sat*, preventing the self from falling back to the phenomenal attachment. The 5 holy syllables '*Na*' '*Ma*' '*Śi*' '*Va*' '*Ya*'.
This mantra should be repeated and contemplated, and incorporated in the inner worship mentioned in an earlier paragraph, as the path of friend.

The ninth sūtra concludes the first part of the special section, that is, sūtra seven to nine. The following second part, sūtra ten to twelve , deals with the fruits of liberation.

Fruits of liberation: Special part, Sūtra 10-12

After dealing with the means of liberation, the author proceed to the last part about the result of liberation, in order to inspire the candidate to pursue the ultimate end of Śaiva Siddhānta.

Sūtra 10

The full translation of the tenth sūtra is following according to textbook:

> "If the self becomes one with the Lord, even as the Lord is (one) with the self and abides in the Lord's service, powerful karma with mala and māyā passes away" [59]

This sūtra deals with the self in the condition of final liberation in which the service of the self is replaced with the service of the Lord, that is, the experience of itself as that which is in union with the Lord, and therefore is an experience of the Lord Himself as Bliss, leaving the maḷas behind.

[59] p.373, Mudaliar: "Sivajñānamāpādiyam" (1985).

The intention here is to describe the result of the attainment of the ultimate knowledge and having pondered over the five-syllable mantra: The removal of the impurities, and the experience of eternal bliss.

The sūtra is divided in three statements[60]:

1) The self becoming one with the Lord as He was one with the self

2) If the self abides in Him as His servant the powerful karma with maḷa and māyā is removed

Statement 1: The self becoming one with the Lord as He was one with the self

Here it is stated that the self has to leave its ego-centred individual self to be one with the Lord Śiva. The precondition of this is that the Lord was already one with the self (in the state of bondage), though unrealised in its identification with the world of objects. So even if the Lord was in union with the self, the self was not in union with the Lord due to the identification with the ego and its attachment to the world, as in the separation of the knower, the known and the knowing. The subject is related to the object as a quality of the self expressed as its action (the process of knowing)[61]. Only by loosing the world (and oneself therein), can being be won, as *identity* of the knower, the known and the knowing.

Statement 2: If the self abides in Him as His servant the powerful karma with mala and māyā is removed

Being a servant to the Lord means to act alone by His guiding power, new karma (*āgāmi*) cannot arise (and the accumulated *karma* has already been destroyed), so the *maḷas* is removed and the obstruction of union with the Lord is removed and passes away as an experience of the body, with which the self is not identified any more, so the self can remain in the body without causing new *karma*; *asat* is there but has no power over the self as *asat* cannot function in the presence of *sat*[62].

Sūtra 11

The full translation of the eleventh sūtra is following according to textbook:

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[60] p.376-382, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).
[61] p.377, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).
[62] p.382, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

"Like the self that enables the seeing eye to see, the Lord sees and makes the self see.
So in unforgetting love the self reaches the feet of Hara" [63]

In this eleventh sūtra the condition of the tenth sūtra is brought in a even higher state, than that of being in the Lords service and removal of impurities by manifestation of Grace, as the manifestation of the Lords Bliss can only manifest in the fifth state of conscious (*turīyātīta*).

The sūtra is divided in three statements[64]:

1) Like the self which makes the seeing eye see, the Lord makes the self see and sees

2) In unforgetting love the self reaches the feet of Hara

Statement 1: Like the self which makes the seeing eye see, the Lord makes the self see and sees

This statement deals with the Advaita relation between self and the Primal Being that makes the self know what the Primal Being knows, that is, Himself and the selves. The selves need the Lord for their very existence as well as their actions, as the manifestation of the potencies of cognitions, emotions and will. Both in bondage and in release the Lord is pervasive, and in the last state the experience of the Bliss is the experience of the nature of the Primal Being as pure Bliss, thus making the third aspect complete: *Satcitānanda*.

When experienced as bliss by the realised selves, all forms of being is experienced as Bliss, as they only know being, sat, not knowing pain or pleasures of the world.

Statement 2: In unforgetting love the self reaches the feet of Hara

How is this fifth state attained by the self? By the devotion and love the eternal Bliss will be experienced. Love completes the knowledge and causes the experience of Bliss. When the impurities is removed the knowledge of the self will shine and reveal itself as dependent of the Lord, causing the absolute knowledge, and realising this, the self's love to its source will open for the experience of eternal Bliss.

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[63] p.383, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).
[64] p.386-395, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

Sūtra 12

The full translation of the twelfth sūtra is following according to textbook:

> "He washes away the impurity which prevents his reaching the lifting feet like red lotus, joins the company of the loving devotees and worships as Hara Himself, the habit of the devotees who abound in love setting apart delusion and His shrines" [65]

This sūtra deals with the self in a realised state with a body (*jīvanmukta*); still in the world and in activity, thinking and speaking. How is this self to live as a thinking, feeling and willing living creature? He seeks the company of other devotees, and worships the Lord in His temples, still being in service of the Primal Being, living in His Bliss.

The sūtra is divided in four statements[66]:

1) He washes away the impurity which prevents his reaching the lifting feet like red lotus
2) He joins the company of the loving devotees
3) He worships as Hara Himself, the habit of the devotees
4) The statements of conduct of the released should be stated as imperative

Statement 1: He washes away the impurity which prevents his reaching the lifting feet like red lotus

Both *māyā* and *karma maḷa*, and the root-*maḷa* is rooted out. The characteristic of Śaiva Siddhānta is its insistence on the possibility of the impurities to re-enter and cloud the absolute knowledge. It means that a *jīvanmukta* must guard his knowledge not to be diluted, thus not being free to think and do what he pleases. There exist a possibility that the three impurities will once again gain power over the realised soul; as long as the self is connected to a body it is also subject to the fruit of *karma* (*prarabdha karma*) and therefore also accessible to re-entering in the circle of life and the low of *karma* resulting the loosing the experience of Bliss.

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[65] p.395, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).
[66] p.397-408, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

Statement 2: He joins the company of the loving devotees

Securing the state of liberation means that the self should only enjoy the company of other liberated devotees, to prevent that selves in bondage to bring the liberated self back in touch with the world. This shows that the society of devotees is important, even for a liberated self, and that the attainment of the state of *jīvanmukti* (the attainment of liberation while living in a physical body) is not a final state until the body has fallen away (*videhamukti*).

Statement 3: He worships as Hara Himself, the habit of the devotees

This means that the Lord is visible through the worship of His devotees and the sacred places of worship, seeing these as the Primal Being Himself. He is pervasive in a visible form those who has experienced His Bliss, thus making a distinction between the visibility and invisibility of His presence.

Statement 4: The statements of conduct of the released should be stated as imperative

As one with the world and the self and different, the perspective of difference makes it necessary to state the worship of the Prima Being as imperative. The worship is also important to secure the released state (as mentioned above) and is therefore stated in the form of imperative.

The Metaphysical Question of Being and Non-Being

After the previous exposition of Śaiva Siddhānta as conceived by Śivajñānamunivar in his commentary to *Śivajñānabodha*, we now enter the part which deals with application of this general analysis, on the field of metaphysics, using interpretations of the result of what we already have learned, to achieve an understanding of the metaphysical preconditions. We are thus not able to understand the concept of being and the state of the world unless we define the concept of metaphysics and its origin.

To know what metaphysics is we have to understand that the concept of metaphysics is a *western* discipline of philosophy, separated from theology, and subject to the fate of philosophy in modern times to be dissolved in the sea of epistemology. We therefore have to start this part of examination to ask the fundamental question: What is the proper definition of metaphysics and how is its proper object defined?

Understanding Metaphysics

Metaphysics is a discipline in western philosophy accepted by the philosophers after Aristotle, as initiated by that part of Aristotle's work which dealt with matters which literally came 'after' the physics, but logically is prior in the sense that it forms the foundation of physics. The field of metaphysics deals with the most general principles of philosophy.
What is reality? Or: What is being as such?[67] Aristotle answers these questions by pointing to the most primary object in the domain of that which *is*[68]. An attempt to define philosophy and its object as being thus involves enquiries into the nature of the first principles and fundamental causes of the existents, that is, substances - and the different kind of beings which constitute reality.

For Aristotle the exemplary being is termed 'substance', which is the primary being in the world, that which truly exists. Aristotle were primarily interested in the structures which constituted the reality and therefore uses concepts like 'substance/quality', 'matter/form', and 'potential/actual', to explain the nature of reality. According to Aristotle 'substance' refer to a *substratum* as that which holds the qualities together in an existent thing, though itself hidden by the same qualities. The qualities of a substance are wholly dependent on the substance, which in turn is defined as the concrete unitary existence of the particular which unites matter and form, with a *priority* of actuality over potentiality. In this way Aristotle argues that the composite substances are supported and sustained by a necessary, eternal and changeless substance which is pure actuality, God, or Primal Being[69].

For this paper the concept of substance as stated by Aristotle is too narrow to grasp the possible forms of being and beings in a meaningful understanding of the concept of reality in modern philosophy, and will therefore be supplemented to cover our subject. The definition of Martin Heidegger will serve as a guideline for the additional *meaning* of being, that is, how we are to

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[67] p.79, Book Gamma (1), Aristotle: "*Metaphysics*", Penguin Books, London (1998).
[68] p.81, Book Gamma (2), Aristotle: "*Metaphysics*", Penguin Books, London (1998).
[69] The discussion of the substance as a composition of form and matter, p.248-250, Eta (6), and in relation to potentiality and actuality, p.266-279, Book Theta (6-9), primary matter and primary form exempted, p.358-361,and 365-367, Lambda (3 and 5), and in relation to eternal and imperishable substance, p.367- 371Lambda (6), and as a theology, prime mover and source of everything in the world, p.372-375, Lambda (7), and as self-consciousness, p.382-384, Lambda (9) and in respect of truth and falsity, and being and non-being, Theta (10) Aristotle: "*Metaphysics*", Penguin Books, London (1998).

interpret 'being' according to the understanding we already exist in, in a truthful way[70]. The methodology of this kind of metaphysics is carried out by way of interpretation of what is presented to us as real in both a manifold and unitary way.

The metaphysical enquiry which will be carried out in this chapter is therefore done: A) firstly as an exposition of both *explicit* and *implicit* metaphysically statements, to also discover what is implied but not explicitly stated; B) secondly as both in a *primary* and *secondary* form in which we able to discover not only what can be derived directly as existents (as the being of the world), but also that which express a different being (as the being of a proposition which points to the world), only meaningful as compared to reality; C) thirdly as differentiating between being in an *absolute* or *conditioned* perspective, which in western philosophy could be applied to the difference between thomistic and kantian concept of being.

Thus we can apply these three *aspects* in combination with the following five *categories* of being:
1) Being *as such*; the characteristics of the most general concepts or categories of existents
2) The nature of *substances*; an exemplary independent being and its qualities and characteristics
3) The nature of *modified* kind of beings; a characterisation of different modifications of being, or the way something presents itself in a non-substantial way (as appearance, phenomenon, etc.)
4) Being as *causality*; that which conditions the manifestation of beings (māyā, time, space, etc.)
5) The *meaning* of being; an interpretation of one or more of the previous four aspects of metaphysics.

The metaphysical enquiry which will be carried out in this chapter is therefore an interpretation of both explicit and implicit statements, to obtain a coherent understanding of reality; first a brief analysis of three traditional Indian philosophies to acquire a 'baseline' to understand the specific characteristics of Śaiva Siddhānta in relation to other selected philosophies. Given that metaphysics is a western discipline, I will attempt to make my interpretations as contextual as possible,

[70] p.10-15, Heidegger, Martin: "*Sein und Zeit*" (1967)

Three Traditional Positions Regarding the Definition of 'Being'

My intention in this paragraph is to concentrate on the concept of 'being' as revealed in the basic scriptures of three classical orthodox traditions: Sāṅkhya, Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta. These three schools are frequently mentioned in "*Śivajñānamāpādiyam*" and appears to be the main external opponents of Śaiva Siddhānta's views.

Sāṅkhya

Īśvaraḳṛṣna is the author of *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, the oldest available text of the Sāṅkhya-philosophy. Even though the probable date of *Sāṅkhyakārikā* is between 250-350 AD, the philosophy exposed in this kārikā is considered to be pre-buddhist in age, and therefore one of the oldest Indian orthodox philosophical traditions.

The metaphysical statement of Sāṅkhya is strictly dualistic, based on an assumption of two different kind of substances or non-reducible primary beings: *Prakṛti* and *puruṣa*.

Prakṛti is the principle of the world and matter, comprising both the original root-cause of the world, *mūlaprakṛti*, and the manifested evolutes. *Prakṛti*, which manifest itself through time and space, is both the condition for, and manifestation of, the whole creation. *Mūlaprakṛti* being the root-cause of the world is defined in opposition to the manifested world as uncreated, infinite, pervasive, one, unsupported, non-composited, non-manifest and independent; defined as *similar* to the manifested world, *Mūlaprakṛti* is characterised by the three *guṇas*, and as being objective, general, non-conscious and productive[71]. This un-manifest root-cause of the manifested world manifests what is already potentially existent, as effects which make up the course of evolution of the world, according to the theory of *Satkāryavāda*, until the creational cycle is traversed and the re-absorption into the root-cause is accomplished.

Puruṣa, on the other hand, is the principle of sentience characterised as the *absence* of the three *guṇas*, as subjective (inherent purposeful), special (multiple), conscious, passive, and as the final cause (purpose) of *prakṛti*, enjoyer, without parts, and multiple[72]. *Puruṣa* is also considered as a witness, possessed of freedom, indifferent, and inactive.

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[71] p.258-259, Larson, Gerald James: "*Classical Sāṃkhya*", Motolal Banarsidass, Delhi (1969)
[72] p.261-262, Gerald James: "*Classical Sāṃkhya*", Delhi (1969)

These two kinds of substances, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, possesses some features which characterises them:

1) As two *incompatible* special kinds of being not depending on, or reducible to, something else; clearly an expression of a metaphysical dualism with the decisive difference of resp. absence or presence of the three *guṇas*, separating the two kinds of beings (*puruṣa* and *prakṛti*) and therefore inflicted with an inherent problem of interaction.

2) As two *compatible* beings *sharing* some characteristics; there are indications of a being which is common to the otherwise completely different substances: They are both regarded as:

a) Uncreated, that is, eternal and independent, and

b) Infinite and

c) Without parts (changeless)

These are the marks of the being which expresses reality itself as that which lies behind the diversity of the world and makes it possible to manifest itself according to its potential being, by the proximity of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, indicating the link behind the mysterious purposeful connection between self and matter.

The whole manifested world evolves itself from this mysterious connection designated as the proximity of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, characterised by the purposefulness of the world for the sake of *puruṣa*, and possessing the marks of being eternal, independent and without parts. This connection can only be broken by the act of being *seen*; in the moment the difference is seen, *puruṣa* realises its freedom to the effect of the cessation of the performing female principle, regarding to this specific *puruṣa*[73]. By realising the difference in terms of objectivity and subjectivity, being is now preserved in pure form as *puruṣa* wrapped around itself is not touched anymore by the principles of matter and activity.

Thus the *meaning* of the world regarding its being is the proximity of subjectivity and objectivity; the difference between these two and what is manifested in the *mystical* space left by nearness.

[73] p.275, Gerald James: "Classical Sāṃkhya", Delhi (1969)

Nyāya

Nyāya philosophy is very much concerned with true knowledge and the means and method of attaining this. Nyāya can be labelled as a metaphysical realism and pluralism, and the concern of this paper will focus on these two characterisations of the metaphysical position of Nyāya.

The philosophy of Nyāya is founded on 16 topics or aspects of reality (*padārthas*) which covers all relevant philosophical and logical subjects which defines philosophy.
There are two main types of reality: Being (*bhāva*) and non-being (*abhāva*), denoting resp. all that is positively, and all that is not. What truly *is*, is subdivided in six kind of beings: Substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), the universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and the relation of inherence (*samavāya*)[74]. Substance, quality, and action are existents, whereas universal, particulars, and relation of inherence is said to subsist in the existents. There are nine kinds of substances: Earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space soul and mind. These substances is of very different kinds; the first four is the four elemental indivisible atoms, then the mind which is a subtle atomic cognition instrument, then ether (*ākāśa)* which is an pervading medium for sound, and space and time are infinite dimensions which hold all finite objects within them. Every one of these substances is said to be one, eternal and infinite.

In the scheme of Nyāya the existents are primary due to the causal doctrine that every cause necessary precedes their effects, which means that the effects (qualities) do *not* exists potentially in the cause, making the qualities antecedent to their substance. In Sāṅkhya-philosophy the instrumental and material cause were inherent in the material principle (and indirectly the final cause), but in Nyāya-system the dynamic principles of reality (qualities and actions), though existents, appears as something which are applied to the substances. In the light of this a substance is defined as a thing possessing a genus (*jāti*), and co-existing with quality and action[75].
Thus the qualities are attached to a substratum, and the actions (*karma*) are the series of event which disrupts and destroys conjunctions (of substances) and establishes new, thereby supporting the causal theory of *asatkaryavāda*. The three subsistent kind of being are universal, particular and inherence. Universals inhere in all particulars as their essence or class, and these universals are

[74] p.153, Chatterjee, Satischandra: "*The Nyāya Theory of knowledge. A Critical Study of some problems of Logic and Metaphysics*", University of Calcutta, Calcutta (1978).
[75] p.8-10, Part III, Kuppuswami Sastri, S: "*A Primer of Indian Logic – According to Annambhatta's Tarkasamgraha*", The Kuppuswami Sastri Recearch Institute, Chennai (1998).

eternally ideally forms, and are related to particular as inherence[76]. The class of substanceness itself is held to be eternal, one, and connected with all substances through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). The most general universal is *sattā* which characterises the genus of *sat*, being, which can inhere in only the three kinds of existents[77].

The five substances of elements are elemental beings (*bhūta*) which conjoins in structures which makes up the visible world. As opposed to the objects of the world the self is qualified by cognition, and these are of two kinds: The supreme self (*paramātman*) and the individual self (*ātman* or *jīva*); the *supreme* self is one, omnipotent and omniscient, and the instrumental cause of the world, while the *individual* self is all-pervasive and eternal, but limited by its connection with a body. The individual self can only experience through the mind (*manas*) which is atomic, eternal and multiple, and connected to individual selves to make them capable of experiencing pleasure and pain through this inner sense.
The individual self as a substance is qualified by knowledge or consciousness which is the differentiating feature of each self. The self is revealed by an inner perceptual experience as self-conscious and self-identity defined through the qualified consciousness as will, desire or knowledge. The self as pure self cannot be directly apprehended, only indicated through inference. The self is thus a substance which is known through its qualifying attributes, while mind, though a substance too, is an atomic entity capable of inner apprehension of these qualities or apprehending outer sense data from external senses.

Thus the most comprehensive category of reality is *being*; in the realm of being (the most general universal) unfolds the substances, their qualities and actions, in a manifold of manifestations. The nine kinds of substances signify different kind of experienced beings which makes up a real universe reflecting the logical distinctions of the subject and object and their respective relations. Being is eternal, one, and infinite; this is the most general feature of beings which runs through the nine substances which makes up the modes of beings.

Being, then, is a hidden substratum divided into fundamental differentiation of *modes* of beings and how they show themselves in the interaction with other beings, qualities, and actions; the Nyāya is a

[76] p.18-37, Part III, Sastri, S: "*A Primer of Indian Logic*" (1998)
[77] p.21-24, Part III, Sastri, S: "*A Primer of Indian Logic*" (1998)

realist position, as being here is understood as independent and multiple exemplary beings, and this is direct related to how they are perceived and inferred in experience. Each of nine kinds of substances represents a dimension of the dynamic world we perceive, explaining concrete phenomena in the physical world structured as language. Non-being may be understood as a kind of infinite enhancement of the structure of the world as eternal, to support a concept of being as something which is rationally verifiable in the experienced world.
The atomic theory is an example of this metaphysics of logic and experience which multiplies the 'difference' and 'proximity' of Sāṅkhya, to the extent of making them operational to explain ordinary physical and mental occurrences in experience.

Advaita Vedānta

In this paragraph the metaphysics of Advaita Vedānta is considered as a third system different from the dualism of Sāṅkhya and polyism of Nyāya philosophy. Although Sāṅkhya defended a dualistic position we saw that there are some ontological features which tied the two seemingly incompatible substances (*puruṣa* and *prakṛti*) together. We also reviewed the logical realism of Nyāya in which a multitude of substances shared some few features but which also showed the multitude of substances as depending on an incorporation of exemplary qualities of some empirically experienced or inferred types of beings, in the overall concept of being.

Now we will deal with the monistic metaphysics of Śaṅkarācārya's Advaita Vedānta which tries to develop a concept of being capable of comprising everything that *is*, within the framework of one all-encompassing unitary reality, without loosing its relation to experience of the worldly objects.

Advaita Vedānta emphasizes the reality of an unqualified *Brahman*, and regards *īsvara* and the individual self as part of the world, as mere appearances caused by a principle of illusion, that is, *māyā*[78].
Ignorance is due to non-discrimination between that which is permanent, and that which is impermanent; the permanent reality which is the self or *Brahman*, is held to be one, independent, changeless and eternal, as opposed to the impermanent phenomenal world which derive its diversity

[78] The following is derived from Śri Ādi Śaṅkarācārya: "*Tattvabodha*", Central Chinmāyā Mission Trust, Mumbai, (2010).

and impermanence from the underlying changeless substratum of being.[79]. Reality is identical with *Brahman* which in its highest mode of being is considered without forms or qualities; as such only the self or *Brahman* is real; everything else is unreal, which includes all possible phenomena of the world.

Another aspect is reality in the form of the self; this persistent self is that which experiences the world (non-self) which in turn is that which is experienced as objects, and therefore impermanent, as opposed to reality, *sat*, which remains the same in all three periods of time. The self realising itself as different from the non-self – differentiating between the real and the unreal - will as a result of this realisation merge into *Brahman*, as part of this absolute existence. This absolute being is of the nature of consciousness, being, and bliss (*citsadānanda*) which is all there is left when the unreal has been revealed and lost its power of illusion, as there can be no negation of being (*sat*), and no real knowledge of non-being (*asat*)[80].

How then is it possible to explain that the self is primarily cognised as an object in the world of objects, when it is pure being identical with *Brahman*? The answer is that this illusionary belief is caused by the illusionary *māyā* which is ontological indefinable, but reveals itself as of the nature of the three *guṇas* which pervades the world as its root-qualities, though strictly speaking, there is no such entity as *māyā*, only the works of illusion as the aspect of pure being which have the power to conceal (*āvaraṇa śakti*) and project (*vikṣepa śakti*) itself[81]. Being is hidden as something which it is *not*: Impermanence.
This concept of being, therefore, pervades everything there is, but what is perceived is not being, but only relative knowledge of objects which is what being show to us. In this illusory world which is only a partly pierced ignorance, the self has to discover itself through the residuum of being in the world, by the help of the mysterious absolute consciousness hidden by ego, and those poor fragments of happiness which truly are a remote reflection of the absolute bliss of being.

The absolute being which is to be gained by knowledge is defined in negative form, as negation is the only way to describe being through the medium of language: As timeless (*nitya*), changeless

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[79] p.14-17, Śri Ādi Śaṅkarācārya: "Tattvabodha" (2010).
[80] p.36, Śri Ādi Śaṅkarācārya: "Tattvabodha" (2010).
[81] p.85-88, Śri Ādi Śaṅkarācārya: "Tattvabodha" (2010).

(*avikāri*), nameless (*anāmi*), formless (*nirākāra*), and attributeless (*nirguna*)[82]. In this setting the only way to directly experience the reality is to attain the liberation through realising what really *is*: *citsadānanda*, thereby posing the dilemma of being, as ever present but nowhere to be seen and in a state that cannot be brought about, except by realising what can only be described in negative terms, as what it is not.

Thus the metaphysics of Advaita Vedānta is build on a being which is all-encompassing, all-pervading, leaving no room for any other kind of beings - not even the principle of illusion or the substances perceived in this state. The realities of Sāṅkhya and Nyāya metaphysics are in the optic of Advaita Vedānta only illusory appearances, although of a seemingly more stable form as the more fleeting phenomena, but compared to true being they are only expressing an *act* of illusion which is unexplainable.

The Horizon of Being in Selected Indian Traditions

By extracting the definition of western metaphysics and its proper objects in the four definitions supplemented by the hermeneutical method of understanding of being, we had the tool to attempt to analyse and interpret the concepts of being in three different classical Indian traditions, before we will attempt to understand the metaphysics of Śaiva Siddhānta.

We will now summerise in what direction our interpretations have leaded us:
1) Sāṅkhya tradition defines some common features across the boundaries of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*: Being is eternal, independent, infinite and changeless. The meaning of the causal relation of everything there *is*, can be said to be the proximity of subjectivity and objectivity; the mystical nearness across the difference between the two incompatible substances creates the entire manifest world.
2) In Nyāya the real universe reflecting the logical distinctions of the subject and object and their respective relations. Being is eternal, one, and infinite; this is the most general feature of beings which runs through the nine substances which makes up the modes of beings. Being, then, is a hidden substratum divided into fundamental differentiation of modes of beings and how they show themselves in the interaction with other beings, qualities, and actions. The metaphysics of logic and

[82] p.78-79, Śri Ādi Śaṅkarācārya: "Tattvabodha" (2010)

experience multiplies the 'difference' and 'proximity' of Sāṅkhya, to the extent of making them operational to explain ordinary physical and mental occurrences in the daily experience.
3) In Advaita Vedānta a strict logical and idealistic concept is developed; many inconsistencies displayed in the two other views is solved; the missing account of the foundation and interaction of two incompatible substances, or the concept of a causality of strict preservation of the causal relation, or the opposite, the introduction of something entirely new. In solving these problem in a comprehensive and logical system only invoke an even bigger problem: That of the gap between what we perceive and what really *is*. Being is only conceived of a as negation is the only way to describe the true being through the medium of language: What we are (timeless, changeless, nameless, formless, and attributeless) is what we are, only we don't know it in our dreamlike state, so our true being is to discover what is the case: We are everything there is, and what we are, is evidently not present in our daily experience. Being fills up our void with its multiplicity of negative attributes; discarding everything positive as non-being, and establishing negations as true being: From the perspective of *our* state we are being in the form of *negative* transcendence.

When we view the schools within the Indian orthodox framework we discover that the differences between these three traditions are not primarily because of a difference in understanding of some of the features of being, apart from the common features as 'eternal' "independent" and 'changeless', but because the scope and significance of these concepts expresses different *meanings* and purposes: Either to demonstrate the inherent incompatibility in the world; or to support the logical structure of the concrete experienced world; or finally, to accentuate the unity in the world behind the fragmentations, and insist on the ideal identity of subject and object.

By focusing on true being which is *not* perceived in the world, we are still *thrown back* into the world in our interpretations in which the meaning of being is expressed, even if this is only accomplished in a negative form. With this perspective in mind we are now ready to take a closer at the concept of being in Śaiva Siddhānta which is the foundation of the all other significant concept in this system of thought: What is understood as that which truly *is*?

Śaiva Siddhānta: Being, Non-being and 'Nothingness' [83]

From the analysis of *Sivajñānamāpādiyam* we can collect what is meant by the term 'being'. We know that 'being' is a concept of reality, as that which truly *is*. We have learned in sūtra one, two, six and seven some valuable indications of what being is supposed to mean: One, changeless, independent, without parts, and pure consciousness.

The problem with this definition of being - and beings which possesses being - is that it cannot adequate be defined from a perspective of liberation, as being is not an object with positive qualities. Every concept which qualifies being cannot be adequate; none the less we will attempt to categories what being is:

1) Being as *Primal Being*, or *Pati*, shares some characteristics with the two other substances (*paśu* and *paśa*), as being one, without parts, unchanging, independent, and causal. The two last mentioned qualities are to be understood only in a relative sense, as there ultimately are only two truly independent entities: the Primal Being and the root-impurity, *āṇava maḷa*.

2) The quality which separates the Primal Being from the world (and unites it with the being of the selves) is the concept of *pure consciousness*, that is, the quality of sentience.

3) As being ultimately is the *cause of the world* it must also be present in some form in what it is *not*.

This definition of being is our steppingstone to other central concepts which we will now try to understand, as every other central concept necessarily depends on what being is: How are we to understand what is *not*, that is, non-being?

The world of Non-being

From the concept of being we naturally arrives at the negative concept of non-being (*asat*). This is not considered to be a simple negation of being, but rather signifying: That which is 'something', but still not a *true* being. Or more precise: Non-being is not a global negation of being, rather a local negation in which only some of the characteristics of being is denied, but not all.

Now, if being is eternal, one, and changeless; what then is non-being?

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[83] The concept of 'nothingness' may seem a bit out of a context as it usually is connected to the transcendent being of human being in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre. This aspect of our being might give an understanding of what form negativity may project into our empirical world of objects, as causing the difference between being and non-being.

In the first sūtra we were told that the manifest world and everything in it, is subject to the three changes: Origination, development, and decay, and that they have names and gender, and is therefore to be regarded as produced by causes, originally one root-cause, which is the Primal Being, by way of His Power, *Śakti*. With other words: The material cause of the world is *māyā*, and the instrumental cause is The Lord's *Śakti*.

In the dualism of Sāṅkhya the constitutive event of the world is *puruṣa's* proximity to *mūlaprakṛti*, which opens the realm of the manifested world already in seed-form in the material principle. This scheme is in many way preserved in the philosophy of Śaiva Siddhānta, but never the less modified on some very decisive points:

1) *Prakṛti* is not the root-cause of the world, but an intermediate cause which itself is an effect of some more original cause.

2) *Prakṛti* is not a self-contained entity with inherent powers, but is guided, sustained and pervaded by true reality

3) *Prakṛti* is a result of the working of three different maḷas, two of which are instruments of The Lord, one of which is devoid of the Primal Being.

As the working of *karma maḷa* has *māyā maḷa* as its substratum, and *māyā* is the material cause of the world, both are considered as substances, and both are instrumental in respect of the working of the Primal Being to liberate the selves from a state of bondage. From the pure *māyā* (*suddha·māyā*) evolves the pure body of the Primal Being or the subtle world, where the liberated pure selves dwell - and from which evolves the impure *māyā* (*asuddha māyā*) with the five manifestations which enable the selves to experience in a general way, and furthermore the following five evolutes manifesting the five infirmities of the selves which qualifies *puruṣa*; then only follows the *mūlaprakṛti* and the 24 *tattvas* known in Sāṅkhya.

Time: The Opening of Non-being

Let us take a closer look at the first evolutes, time (*kāla*), of impure *māyā*, which opens the entire range of beings and powers in the gross world. From time evolves destiny (*nyati*), agency (*kalā*), knowledge (*vidyā*) and attachment (*rāgha*), which together forms the precondition of the selves'

potencies of volition, cognition and conation in the world, making the experiences and enjoyments performed by the individual selves possible[84].

As time is the necessary condition of a sequential ordered causal relation, it means that time opens for the entire manifested world and the experience of this. As the Primal Being transcends time and other limitations He will not be subject to these, but the experiencing selves and the world is only manifested within time, as the world and the condition of experience is ontologically constituted by the evolvement of time. All things experienced can only take place within the horizon of time, which has *māyā* as its direct material cause, as nothing can evolve without succession of manifestation.

It thus follows that the time in the form of evolutes of *impure māyā* must be an echo of the time of pure *māyā* within which the powers of the Primal Being manifests, making the experience of liberated souls possible in the manifesting of pure *māyā*. The impure world is different from pure world, but it still bears its *imprint* as a symmetrical *similarity* of this ideal existence[85]. Though the structure of impure *māyā* is determined by the immediate causal conditions, it also mirrors the higher form of itself in the condition of the pure *māyā*. These characteristic figures of *mirroring* and *symmetry* in the worlds will be elaborated further in a later chapter.

Prakṛti manifests the quality of origination, development and decay, making the worldly existence of birth and death possible. Time makes the unfolding of existence possible in the three divisions of time as past, present and future, which transform a phenomenon from the potential state to the manifest and back to the unmanifested state again as it causes new phenomenon to arise.

Within the unfolding of time (*kāla*), destiny (*nyati*) is the next evolutes, thus establishing the framework of experiences in a restricted time-space continuum; from this follows the limited agency or volition (*kalā*), and from agency follows knowledge (*vidyā*) and attachment (*rāgha*) respectively. By these evolutes the worldly experiences of the individual selves is possible with the

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[84] p.187 f.f., Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam*" (1985).

[85] The sequence of evolutes has to be mediated by the modification of pure evolutes in the impure *māyā*, as, for example, pure time cannot be the cause of the effect of the impure *māyā*; therefore the impure time is a necessary evolute. The two evolutes though essentially different share the identity class of temporality, connecting the pure time to be instrumental in the forthcoming of the impure time. p.188, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

awakening of their cognitive, volitional, and conational potencies, which makes the connection between action and experience effective, thereby driving the mechanism of *karma maḷa* in the world[86]. The evolutes are the following:

1) Destiny or space (*nyati*) is not a purely physical space but rather the restrictive power regarding all-pervasiveness to the condition of limitation, especially with regards to cause and effects. This is expressed in the power of *karma* as that aspect with directs the results of deeds in the form of appropriate experiences of pleasure and pain in the same individual selves.

2) Agency (*kalā*) reveals the volitional potency of the individual selves; this evolute partly removes the effect of the root-mala; the intellect which reveals objects is also seat of volition, that is, the decision with respect to the experienced objects. As the original condition of the self is a condition of a state of absolute isolation, it needs an instrument to manifest its agency, and this is *kalā* which makes it possible for the self to make the intellect the place of operational decisions of activity in the world of mind, speech and actions[87].

3) The evolute of *vidyā* manifest the cognitive potency of the individual selves as to make it possible to cognise determinate and indeterminate perception, and establish these in the process of cognition connected to examination, determination and identification. In the chapter on true and erroneous cognition we will deal with the process in a more detailed fashion; for now it is sufficient to place the manifestation of knowledge in the context of evolution.

4) The last of the five evolutes or restrictors (*pancakañcuka*) which completes the timely experience, is attachment (*rāga*); this conative potency makes it possible for the individual selves to be attached to the object presented, or rather the object can be presented fully in the light of attachment, to secure the world of objects as meaningful and as something with which the self can identify with the help of the ego. Through the instrumental conative potency the intellect is objectified by the self including this activity of disposition of the intellect which is an integral part of the form of the object[88]. This important aspect exposes the "why" of the special directedness of the consciousness as a general potency, as well as the specific attention in our field of possible objects, and it also makes the decision-making of the volitional power conceivable. It is not the pleasurable quality of a thing which makes it desirable; it is the experiential cognition of the

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[86] p.187-207, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
[87] p.198, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
[88] p.202, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

particular self which constitute the attraction, repulsion or indifference in relation to a given object[89].

It may be noted in this stage that the evolutes of the pure *māyā* and the impure *māyā* may be interpreted as a multi complex of a hierarchy of necessary transcendental conditionals which makes the actual experienced world possible to be acted upon by the empirically experienced subjects or ego-selves. Each evolutes constitute a function according to which the evolutes operates in a precisely defined manner from which it cannot divert, and the given succession of evolutes means a further refinement and specification towards the empirical world.

The being of the world is primary *time*, brought about as a remedy of the Primal Being for the workings of the root-*maḷa* on one side, and constituting the very power of ignorance in the world on the other hand. Time comes into being as *āṇava maḷa* is touched by being through His power, making the world come into existence; the world is not nothing, but rather timely existence perceived as impermanence, non-being.
But if this existence is non-being (*asat*), what then is *āṇava maḷa* which causes the world as timely existence to be?

Āṇava Maḷa: The Foundation of Non-being

We will now take a closer look at sixth sūtra in *Śivajñānabodha* which states the nature of sat and *asat* on account of knowability; the nature of being and non-being is derived from the way we perceive them. As *asat* is caused, changing and timely, the world in which we perceive objects can only be of that nature, that is, impermanence. Being, then, must be that which is eternal, one and changeless and the ultimate substratum and cause of non-being; we *know* non-being *because* of its support in being, but at the same time we do *not* know being because of bondage. Being *cannot* be known through the world; only in a *transcendent* state guided by the Primal Being's force in a divine intuition, detached from that objectification of the world which otherwise excludes the knowledge of being.

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[89] Some of these formulations intentionally implicates a certain similarity with Kant's critical transcendental philosophy, and Husserl's phenomenology, in western philosophy which will be treated in a later paragraph; the differences, though, in the contextual setting of western and Indian philosophy must certainly not be underestimated.

The meaning of being is connected to *āṇava maḷa*, though, as non-being only makes sense (and is possible) in connection to *āṇava maḷa*, the opposition to being, that is, in its pure form the appearance of an absolute *absence* of being (and non-being) in relation to the selves. In the fourth sūtra it is mentioned that the self is from the beginning of time in a relation to *āṇava maḷa*, which causes the appearance of the self to be *devoid of knowledge* as such[90]. Being in a world means being in potentially five different states of consciousness (*jāgrat*, *svapna*, *suṣupti*, *turīya*, and *turiyātīta*); the self appears in different forms of consciousness of something. Pure *Āṇava maḷa* (as in a state of world-sleep) means the appearance of absolute absence of consciousness (*kevala*), in which the self appears as if it does not know anything at all, not even itself. This aspect of *nothingness* or spiritual darkness in which the self is concealed from itself is the root-cause of the world which bears the marks of its cause as a negative aspect derived from this positive power of an eternal substance with potencies operating in our selves[91].

Āṇava maḷa, then, when it is *associated* with the evolutes of *māyā* and *karma*, causes the five states of consciousness (*sakala*)[92]. As *āṇava maḷa* is a substance, one, eternal, pervasive, and possessing potencies in relation to the self, it is an active entity which are able to obscure the consciousness of the selves because of the nature of the self to *identify* with entities with which is associated. Even in the partially pierced absence of knowledge which is the world, our limited consciousness can only comprehend through identification, which means that we are always intentionally directed *outwards* towards objects in the world, due to this darkness in our hearts, and therefore we cannot know ourselves as the self can never be comprehended within the framework of an object[93].

Thus the limited objectifying consciousness is on one hand a mark of the self under the influence of darkness, *āṇava maḷa*, but on the other hand can also be seen as piercing the darkness in the form of perceiving objects. In this penetrating light of the objectifying consciousness lies the activity of the pervasive awareness as the source of all forms of cognition. Consciousness is given a world within the horizon of time, as a partially concealment of the pervasive awareness without which no cognition would be possible.

To summarise the characterisation of the selected three positions of Indian philosophical traditions:

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[90] p.246, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

[91] p.67, Arunachalam, Thiru M.: "*The Concept of Consciousness in Saiva-Siddhanta*", p.65-74, in Indian Philosophical Annual, Volume eleven, The Dr. S Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy University of Madras (1976)

[92] p.257-260, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

[93] p.71, Arunachalam.: "*The Concept of Consciousness in Saiva-Siddhanta*" (1976)

1) In Sāṅkhya school's dualistic philosophy *prakṛti* was understood as the independent principle of matter penetrating the whole world, and we saw how this system had affinities to a part of the Śaiva Siddhānta's metaphysic, although in a new setting where the Primal Being by way of Its *Śakti* caused the manifestation of the entire creation, including the *mūlaprakṛti* and its 24 evolutes, as product of the lower *asuddha māyā*.
2) The realism and the multiplicity of Nyāya is different from the position of Śaiva Siddhānta, which, though realistic too, nevertheless hold that only three kind of substances exists, and that these (except *āṇava maḷa*) is pervaded and wholly dependent on the One Primal Being.
3) The insistence on the world as real and the root-impurity, *āṇava maḷa*, as a separate substance, makes the position of Śaiva Siddhānta very different from the idealistic monism of Advaita Vedānta.

With this understanding of being, non-being and nothingness (the appearance of negation in the world) we now have an understanding of the *meaning* of being and the world as phenomena: Being is that which truly *is*, and keeps the darkness away in sustaining the timely world. The world is that which the self experiences timely - as a product of simultaneous, but incompatible, relations to the phenomena of absence and being. With other words: The world is the *time* and *place* in which being *appears* in the form of objects.
We will later return to the matter of darkness in a perspective of epistemology, in which the question of being and knowing will be further elaborated.

Notes on the Modern Western Conception of Reality

Since the foundation of metaphysics being attributed to Aristotle, the exploration of the field of metaphysics developed in the period of ancient Greece and Rome through the elaborate systematization during 800 years of Christian (and Muslim) medieval age, seemingly ending in the aftermath of renaissance speculation, as a modern philosophy which struggled to accommodate both the quest of reality *and* the evolving scientific ideals and authority, resulting in the complete triumph of science reducing the reality to a mere instrument of its continual expansion covering all areas of human existence. .

The philosopher who played a key role in reducing metaphysics to an appendix to scientific activity was Emanuel Kant who had a lasting and profound impact on the later Continental and Anglo-

Saxon philosophies. Although the explicit discipline of metaphysics received a final blow in terms of the Kantian critique of reason, the problem of reality was felt in the later philosophies as a *'turning away'* from metaphysics towards the refuges of mathematics, linguistics, psychology, etc. In this way philosophy was deprived of its inner core exhibiting the absence of metaphysics in its more or less desperate attempts to fill the gap of purpose with the authority of any new science which seems to offer philosophy the short term gain in the form of a considerately high degree of status and successful progress.

This movement of 'turning away' thus caused philosophy to acquire an immediate success if linked to one or more of the special sciences, but at the same time it had the effect that reality was reduced to a limited field of knowledge, thereby making the problem of reality an evident presence in all modern philosophy, as an absence of aim and purpose. This problem manifested in figures of philosophising which displayed a peculiar ability *not* to speak of the obvious, but instead to engage in discussions of logical problems. It is in this light of *'turning away'* from reality that modern western philosophy has to be viewed and analysed.
I will leave the specific problems of analytical philosophy in this context and concentrate on three selected western continental philosophers as they have the advantage of an importance not only in relation to the absence of philosophy, but also in relation to a much needed constructive *dialogue* about the nature of reality and the future possibilities of western philosophy.

Kant: Being as transcendental subjectivism

We will now focus on a western philosopher who can be said to be the father of modern philosophy within the framework of western culture.
Kant has become a paradigm of critic of metaphysics in terms of showing the limits of the faculty which he held to be responsible of metaphysical ideas. His fundamental theory of knowledge which replaces the concept of reality, has the following statement as its guiding principle: All phenomenon, experience, mental processes, concepts and ideas are ultimately founded on a transcendental cognitive activity[94].

[94] Kant, Emanuel: *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*", Werkausgabe Band 3-4, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, Frankfurt am Main (1974)

This transcendental philosophy is carried out as an analysis of transcendental receptivity, as forms of mind and thought, and dialectics of reason; thus involving what Kant conceived of as our cognitive faculties. In this respect the concept of phenomenon is the most elemental unit which can be known to us, only leaving a residual 'things in themselves' left for the reality to rest on. The phenomenon is the building block within the framework of time and space, which is forms of receptivity given by consciousness which defines our possible field of experience under which sensations and perception can occur.

The mind is the seat of the operation of transcendental categories and synthesis which makes op our structured world of things, qualities, wholes and parts, causalities, etc. The function of the mind is synthesis of objects and relations which makes the experience accessible for concepts, as opposed to the operation of the reason on the basis of pure concepts free from the application of experiences.

Because the pure reason is not committed to sensation and experiences, it is able to operate as a free power, and it is exactly this freedom which makes it unfit for generation of certain knowledge as it does not operate in the field of forms and categories, but only has the function as a *regulative* principle of thought and actions. The reality is therefore not only banned from experience which is a field of the transcendental forms and categories due to its freedom from experience, but also exiled from cognition connected to reason, as this faculty is only exercising an activity which has no cognitive function. Kant transform the metaphysical question into a epistemological question, thereby leaving the concept of reality to the ghostly 'X' on which the forms and categories are projected.

It was the intention of Kant to make a philosophical system which was able to solve the problem of the foundation of science in a philosophical framework, within which he was able to secure the status of certainty which he felt that empiricism had undermined. The empiricists had made the position of sciences and philosophy insecure with their denial of the possibility of certainty of causal relation, as well as the existence of independent substances, and even the very fabric of time and space; everything was conceived by the empiricists in a relative fashion derived from the sense-data perceived in the concrete experience.

By stating the forms of time and space, and the categories of causal relation, existence, substances, etc. as the *active* performance of the structures of consciousness imposed on an unknown reality,

Kant could successively explain the notion of certainty in our experience of the world, and claim the validity of the scientific knowledge derived from this world of objects. An important part of this was to analyse the function of mind and reason, to show the inadequacy of taking reason to be a proper cognitive faculty, thereby discarding the supposedly metaphysic outcome of the activity of reason as cognitive faculty, and showing its proper function as stating *regulative* principle of thought and activity in the aspect of the idea of wholeness.

By denying the cognitive function of reason, and stressing the active performance of consciousness in making a framework of perception and mind, the concept of a reality was exiled beyond understanding, while the reality of the world we are able to know, rested on activities of our consciousness and is therefore reduced to be a mere something we create for ourselves to make sense of reality. By making this claim Kant continued the anti-metaphysical ideology inherent in modern western philosophy.

Husserl: Being as stream of consciousness

Edmund Husserl is, like Kant, interested in the conditions of our experience and application of concepts, but in Husserl's philosophy it is the way objects in the world are given to us in an original and pure form, as opposed to the practical 'natural' condition of scientific knowledge and ordinary experience. Husserl believed to have found a foundation of all kinds of cognition, volition, and emotions, which would make it possible, by adherence to a strict methodology, to describe its simplest constituent forms.

This does not imply some form of reductionism; the simple foundation of experience and conceptual thinking is found in the original pure phenomena from which our consciousness *constructs* the ordered world of 'inner' mental perceptions and 'outer' external world, and the apprehension of such things as 'objects' which possesses 'qualities', the organic world and the inorganic world, etc. Only by abstention from applying such conceptual 'prejudices' can we hope to know what really *is*. These structures of 'prejudices' is what Husserl calls 'the natural perspective' which is a state in which we are naturally involved in practical life or scientific examination; both can only function within a natural directedness of attention to a field of objects, while the

phenomenological perspective is 'bracketing', suspending, this natural perspective to turn the attention back to the source of the natural world in a reflective movement[95].

In the intentional directedness of the consciousness the meaning of the *intentional* act gives the constitute the object, and this is the key to the phenomenological content of our consciousness. The original givenness of the objects in the immanent presented content constitutes the outcome of the phenomenological reduction. In the reduction consciousness reflects on the its own activity and backtrack what is originally given to it, making its way to the original perceptions untouched by the conceptualisation, categorisation, and synthesises of the consciousness. What is said to be reality is thus a constructed by acts which is ultimately founded in the *transcendental ego*

The phenomenology of Husserl dissolves the metaphysical categories in a 'regional ontology', the positing of being by consciousness, as the pure phenomena as such constitutes region of being (*seinsregion*) to be investigated by the new science of phenomenology[96]. It is thus only possible to talk of reality in terms of the immanent stream of experience and acts of a synthetic consciousness, which collects, categorises and forms objects in the world. Being as a substance is a construction of the act of consciousness making the characteristic features of a thing in the external world, while being as a mental process is the apprehension of the mental elements of the same external thing. The difference is that the mental process and the finding of the immanent stream of consciousness is the source of all other categories of being, thus the closest thing we can come to a reality[97]. There are therefore three different ways we can understand being according to Husserl:

1) As *immanent elements* out of which our reality is constructed (*'urkategorie des seins'*)
2) As *formal ontology* which reflects formal logic (type of objects describable as facts, relations, qualities, etc.)
3) As *regional ontology*; species and genus of concepts applied to beings (the character of different modes of givenness of objects in the transcendental consciousness)
4) As *meaning* of being as active timely self-positing consciousness (the cause and source of being as such)

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[95] §27-§32, Husserl, Edmund: "*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologishe Philosophie*", vol.1, Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen, 1980 (orig. print from 1913)
[96] p.59, §33, Husserl: "Ideen", vol.1 (1980)
[97] p.141, §76, Husserl: "Ideen", vol.1 (1980)

The last point is stressing that the ('enigmatic') question of time is considered at a crucial activity of the consciousness which makes mental processes and their unfolding of diversities a central theme in the explanation of the objective time in terms of self-given phenomenological time. Thus the fourth perspective of being is indicated as the foundation of the evident given elements in the first perspective[98]. The continual flow of a presence of mental processes and its retention in memory is the phenomenological accessible form of time in the immanence of consciousness.

Heidegger: The question of Being

Heidegger has a starting point Husser's phenomenology, and accepts to a certain degree Husserl's concept of a pure phenomenon[99]. The pure phenomenon is something which has to be uncovered without any layer of false apprehension, as especially in an objectifying prejudice. Heidegger does not believe in Husserl's concept of a neutral position of phenomenology, but insists on that every form of cognition is a form of interpretation, and this is also true of metaphysics. Nevertheless Heidegger also insists on metaphysics as the inner core of philosophy, and that any enquiry into metaphysics must be founded on the being of the enquirer, the human being, '*Dasein*'[100]. Heidegger uses a phenomenological methodology to show that metaphysics is possible within the framework of the modern western philosophy. In opposition to Husserl, Heidegger stated that consciousness is only understandable through metaphysics – and not the other way round. This form of ontology (science of being) makes a rethinking of being and human existence necessary.

It is in this context Heidegger focus on the difference of being and beings (objects), that is, reality as such, and the way beings are, expressed in the concept of 'the ontological difference'. In this difference lies a crucial significance as it implies a critique of modern western philosophy, as well as the past interpretations of metaphysics[101]. In the history of philosophy metaphysics being has generally been interpreted as the highest and most exemplary 'thing' which showed what true being was, for example the Thomistic God, Descartes 'thinking substance', Husserl's 'pure consciousness', or the scientific understanding of what is the elemental being as energy and mass.

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[98] Following passage indicates a constitution of the *'Urquelle'* too: "Der transzendentale 'Absolute', das wir uns durch de Reduktionen herauspräpariert haben, ist in Wahrheit nicht de letzte, es is etwas, da ich selbst in einem gewissen tiefliegende and völlig eigenartigen Sinn kostituiert and keine Urquelle in einem letzten and wahrhaft Absoluten hat.", p.163, §81, Husserl: "*Ideen*", vol.1 (1980)

[99] p.27-39, Heidegger, Martin: "*Sein und Zeit*", Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen (1967)

[100] p.2-11, and p.41-63, Heidegger: "*Sein und Zeit*" (1967)

[101] p.188-223, J.L Mehta:"*The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*", Harper Torchbooks, Y.N. (1971)

Heidegger's point is that the concept of such a 'thing' must be kept out of the question of being, as opposed to the *being* of these things. This concept of being exposed by the pre-Socratic thinkers, is that which makes everything that *is* to show themselves to us, that is, the *condition* of showing itself, so that which reveal itself to us could be determined as such and such a 'thing' or substance[102].

In this way being *hides* behind beings (objects), which are revealed in our apprehension as that towards our attention is directed. That is why the objects can become a model of reality, so we are able to *falsely* determine 'real thing' as having objective qualities, and disregard both our own being, and the being as such, as the *condition* of apprehension of objects, that is, of traditional metaphysics.
According to Heidegger, we 'already' have a profound understanding of what *being* is, as we constantly practice this kind of understanding because we as human being essentially *are* this being who understands, which in turn the transcendental constitution is of why we are able understand the objects, the world and each other. Heidegger even claims that being *needs* us, as we are the only creatures which keep being *open* (as reality, history, nature, and even as a misconception in the objectifying understanding of being).

This conception of fundamental ontology makes Heidegger interpret phenomena as consciousness, time, world, things, etc. in the context of the special being of human being, as that which essentially is *transcendence* of itself in terms of a timely being. In this transcendence of ours we are able to in-authentically understand ourselves and reality as such as objects; this is not a false knowledge but an inherent tendency in our being with others that makes us misinterpret reality.
Especially the phenomenon of technology has a crucial role in the misconception of being, as technology is based on instrumentality and objectifying thinking; an issue I will deal with later in this paper, as the misconception (and meaning of being) is not an accidental misconception, but a metaphysical ignorance which determines us in the midst of the world; our being is essentially truthful, but first and foremost as falsehood, that is, *ignorance*.

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[102] p.8-15, Heidegger: "*Sein und Zeit*" (1967).

Śakti – The Potency Between Being and Nothingness

In the previous chapter we focused on the definition and interpretation of being, non-being, and nothingness, an exposition which leads directly to the manifestation of the world. But if the Primal Being manage to manifest evolutes from the pure *māyā* and subtle potencies descending in a hierarchy of beings to the gross matter, how is this creation accomplished knowing that the Primal Being is eternal, one and changeless? The answer to this question is given in the fourth sūtra: "*He, being one with selves and other than they, abides in implicit union with his consciousness-force that they experience going and coming, because of the two fold works.*"[103] The reference to Conscious-force is Siva's *Śakti* which dwells as His potency in the selves, as their capability to will, cognise and desire, that is, experience the fruit of actions from previous existences, and undergoing deaths and births in the journey towards liberation.

Lord Śiva's *Śakti* is thus the *instrumental* cause of the universe as well as the actions and the experiences of the selves, while *māyā* is the *material* cause, moved by means of *karma maḷa* which qualifies *māyā* as its medium, but ultimate moved by Śiva's *Śakti*.
This is expressed in the fivefold function of the Lord where the two (obscuration and grace), means respectively the screening the powers of *āṇava maḷa*, and the potency of Śiva to work in the selves, ultimately to help the selves to transcend the objectifying knowledge of the world to a level of divine vision[104]. The obscuration (*tirobhāva*) is thus the power to direct the three impurities to function as a *whole* for the sake of the liberations of the selves, and Grace is the ascending power inherent in the selves which is necessary to attain liberation.

Between the Primal Being and *āṇava maḷa* there can be no relation, as being cannot know of non-being or the root-cause of the world, but His potencies can work as a bridge between to incompatible entities: Being and *āṇava maḷa*, thereby making the world as non-being possible as a *field* of activity for the sake of the selves.

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[103] p.125, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)
[104] p.131, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)

Māyā is the material cause of the world, eternal, insentient, subtle, and pervaded by the Primal Being[105]. The pure *māyā* as we have seen[106], is the material cause for the pure universe, which in turn is the cause for the manifestation of the impure *māyā*. What is present in the pure *māyā* is echoed in a grosser form below in the impure *māyā*, which constitutes the empirical world of objects in which we live. The evolutes of the pure *māyā* constitute the pure world in which the unembodied souls (*vijñānākalas* and *pralayākalas*) dwells, while the impure delusionary *māyā* constitute the world of selves in bondage.

In its origin, the pure *māyā* has two natures, that of *words* and that of *substances*. We will return later to the aspect of words, for now we concentrate on the aspect of substances which is the locus in which *Śakti* operates. There are five evolutes of Śiva's *Śakti* which operates in the pure *māyā*, as transformation of the original energy from which the potencies and the substances evolve[107]:

1) The form of pure cognitive potency of the Primal Being, named Śiva or *Nada*, experienced by the released selves.

2) The following evolute is the conative potency, *Śakti* or (*Laya* or *Bindu*), manifested in release (*nivrtti*), installation (*prastitha*), knowledge (*vidyā*), peace (*śanti*) and transcendent (*santyatita*).

3) The next manifestation is *Sadāśiva* which absorbs and activates.

4) Next is *īsvara* as subtle activity.

5) The last evolute in pure *māyā* is pure *vidyā* as a state of gross activity.

Though the Primal Being is inseparable from *Śakti*, the potencies of the Primal Being assumes these five forms to be able to operate the world as an instrument to act in the world of changes for the sake of the selves. Therefore the operative powers which makes the world possible through this series of forms of operative powers, from the absolute potency to higher degrees of actuality or the grosser levels of the visible world.

Through His potencies He operates the visible and invisible world manifesting in the field between being and *āṇava maḷa*, the absence of knowledge, which causes the fleeting phenomenal world of

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[105]
[106] p.174, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
[107] p.21, this paper.
p.181-186, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

non-being. This world unfolds in the tension between two incompatible entities in the form of impermanence, that is, *within the horizons of two antagonistic entities.*
By this characterisation the next step is to investigate the world as the limitation of the self in terms of *avidyā*, which is the particular condition we all are subject to, and which defines the limit of knowledge in an objectified world.

Ignorance (1)

Knowledge is a result of the faculty of cognition obtained by way of correct understanding of the appropriate object of knowledge, that is, *true* knowledge. According to Śaiva Siddhānta we cognise in a particular state of our self, in bondage, which defines how to know, and what kind of knowledge we are able to obtain. As we have seen in the previous chapters this state of the self is based on a metaphysical precondition that our *being* in the world, the world itself, and the Primal Being, are the categories which gives us an adequate understanding of our situation, and what we truly *are*, though *not* realised.
The word with which to characterize this condition is *Paśa*, the state of bondage, which signifies a complex of conditional factors which works in diverse way lead by different principles and purposes. One can say that *Paśa* is a structural condition which is a result of heterogeneity of potencies, characterised as the self conditioned by non-being. In the previous chapter we have dealt with this phenomenon of non-being in a metaphysical framework, now we need to explore the specific nature of this condition in order to determine its distinct features, its scope and to separate it from other seemingly similar phenomena. We will shortly mention some of the other schools in regard to this issue, and also take a look at a phenomenon which is to be separated from the comprehensive concept of *Paśa*, that is, the phenomenon of erroneous knowledge.

With the outline of an epistemology, that is, the exposition of the key-elements of *Paśa* in regard to the cognitive aspect, we can define some salient features of how the state of self in *Paśa* is expressed in our experience, and to connect this to a metaphysical understanding in order to understand its deeper nature.

Review of the Epistemology of Śaiva Siddhānta

The first step to understand *Paśa* is to understand the epistemology of Śaiva Siddhānta, which we have dealt with in connection with the concept of being. In Śaiva Siddhānta the Primal Being is the

support of our own existence as well as the existence of the world, and, furthermore, as that which can be known as true Reality by the intuitive cognitive faculty. This last issue is quite central for the philosophy of Śaiva Siddhānta, as it is one of the distinctive features which set it apart from most of the other schools. We will start with a summary of the statements related to second sūtra, and the fourth to the tenth sūtra.

The fundamental condition of a self in bondage, is, that the self stands in relation to *darkness* obscuring the absolute cognition of the Primal Being. As pure darkness means the absolute obscurance of cognition, the self is wholly dependent on the potencies of the Primal Being to screen and divert the darkness by means of His instruments, *māyā* and *karma*, which builds a bridge between being and darkness. The setting in motion of *māyā*, including its evolutes right down to the elemental matter and the workings of *karma* is under the guidance of the Primal Being. The concentration of energy in a single undifferentiated point, *bindu*, which is the seed of pure *māyā*, of which there are two effects: The world of speech, and the world of things. From these two aspects the evolutes of pure *māyā* proceed, and further from this the impure *māyā* develops within the causalities of time and order.

In this condition the self is caught up, wrapped in *māyā*, under influence of the force of *karma*, by way of which it is possible for the self to accumulate *karma* in the form of *saňcitakarma*; to suffer, enjoy, and experience the result of *karma* in the form of *prārabdhakarma*; and to generate new *karma* as *āgāmikarma*, thereby giving the self the opportunity to transcend the world in an act of liberation of this seemingly endless chain of *karmas*[108].
This condition is only possible because of the association (*sakala avastha*) of the sentient self with the insentient evolutes of *māyā*, in particular the sense organs and the inner organs, examining faculty (*citta*), mind (*manas*), ego (*ahaṁkara*) and intellect (*buddhi*)[109]. In this group of cognitive faculties and instruments the present actualised karma is active as the psycho-physical configuration of the individual, defining the particular condition according to the particular karma being actualised for this individual self. The state of the sense organs, the foundational disposition and the function of the memory based on impressions, determines the way the individual self is experiencing the world.

[108] Second sūtra, statement 2 and 3, p19-23, this paper.
[109] Fourth sūtra, p.27-30, this paper.

The self is a consciousness, but the state of this consciousness is highly different according to its corresponding reality; there are five states of which the first two is directed against objects: Waking, dreaming, sleeping, the fourth, and beyond the fourth; all of these is somehow connected to the state of bondage[110].

In the waking state all the faculties are active and participate in the experience of objects; the precondition to the happening of cognition of objects is that the self *identifies* with them via the presentation of this object in the modified mind. How this objectification connects to speech and language will be examined in a later chapter; for now it is only necessary to point to the objects of desire, volition and cognition, all of which is based on a misconception of self and non-self, and is therefore also ignorant of the Primal Being[111].
This state of bondage implies the directedness towards objects which the knowing self (*pramata*) knows truly (in the form of objects to be known, *prameya*) in the process of applying the instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāna*) so as to know the essence of the thing in question. Three kinds of methods of valid knowledge are accepted by Śaiva Siddhānta as auxiliaries: Perception (*pratyakśa*), inference (*anumāna*) and scripture (*śabda*).

In sixth sūtra, statement one, a valuable negative statement is given concerning the concept of ignorance: That the Primal Being is unknowable in terms of objectifying knowledge by way of perception and inference which defines the nature of impermanence (*asat*), and which rules out any knowledge of being[112].
There cannot occur a harmonious realised co-existence of the individualised objectifying knowledge and the intuitive knowledge which is guided by the *Śakti*; as two incompatible cognitive possibilities they are mutually exclusive as the knowledge of the world is based on ignorance, and ignorance is no longer prevailing when the absolute self-knowledge has been realised[113].

The theory of knowledge in the state of bondage is thus based on a metaphysical fact of the self as in a relation to both being and darkness, but this metaphysical established truth is only true as a

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[110] Fourth sūtra, statement three, p.29-30, this paper.
[111] Fifth sūtra, p.30-32, this paper.
[112] p.291, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
[113] p.334, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

mode of cognition based on a fundamental misconception of self and non-self to the effect of identifying itself as an object amongst objects; the self reflects the form it identifies with, and the form it identifies with, is due to the misconception of self and non-self.
It may be asked: Is this state a result of some kind of erroneous judgement to be corrected by way of a different method of cognition? The answer will be presented in the course of a more detailed analysis of the phenomenon of ignorance and erroneous knowledge.

Theory of Error

In *Sivajñānamāpādiyam* the nature of impurity is examined in the fourth sūtra, and different views are considered; one view is to identify the ignorance or nescience with erroneous knowledge[114]. The root-cause of impurity is of course according to Śaiva Siddhānta *āṇava maḷa* as a positive, eternal and pervasive substance which obscures the consciousness of the individual selves which is essential to the self. The Naiyāyikas is refuted as they hold that knowledge is only a quality of self and not belonging proper to the essence of self.

Citta has the function of examining, mind (*manas*) will tentatively classify, ego (*ahaṁkara*) will decide a course of appropriate action, and intellect (*buddhi*) will determine the object in question. The reason why this process can be subject to knowledge is that the self is conscious of these activities and of itself (as conscious), and that it experiences in the form of pleasure and pain. The causing of the five states of consciousness is constituted by the effects of *māyā* and *karma maḷa* to counter the darkness of *āṇava maḷa* which hides the fact of the self as an all-pervasive knowing substance[115].
To further examine the nature of ignorance and erroneous knowledge we will first take a look at the position of the Naiyāyikas.

Theory of cognition and erroneous knowledge in Nyāya-philosophy

The Nyāya-tradition, which specialises in epistemology and reasoning, consider a theory of erroneous cognition in the following way[116]. All cognitions can be categorised as either recollection (caused by seed impressions), or experience. There are two kind of cognitive experiences: Real or erroneous experiences. These are differentiated in the following way: Experiences which cognises

[114]
[115] p.259-268, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
[116] p.256-258, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
p.104-138, Kuppuswami: "*A Primer of Indian Logic*" (1998).

an attribute as belonging to a thing which really exists in this substance is valid, and experiences which cognises an attribute as belonging to a thing which doesn't exists in this substance is invalid.

Definition of Pramāṇa

According to Nyāya there are four kinds of valid cognitions (*pramānas*): Perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and comparison (*upamāna*). We will here primarily concern us with perception and conceptualisation, rather that with formal inference and testimony because they only involve valid knowledge of a higher order than that in perception, involving inferential fallacies and misinterpretation which is not our primary concern us in respect of the concept of illusion and the forming of an object as such.

According the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana to Gauṭama's *Nyāyasūtra*, a *pramāna* is defined as a means of cognising objects correctly, or more precise: "*That by the instrumentality of which things are rightly cognised*"[117] The object of a *pramāna* is therefore secured by the instrumentality of at least one *pramāna*, *if* the conditions and guiding principles of this is followed in the process of cognition.

Vātsyāyana states that perception is the most important kind of cognitions, because of its significance in regard to the three others, as none of these three were possible if perception was not there, and on account that it is only the perception which truly satisfies the inquisitive mind of Man[118].

Determinate and erroneous perception

In the perceptive of cognition there are two kinds: Indeterminate and determinate cognition[119]. The *first* is a cognition which is pre-communicative being without determinative relation, whereas the *second* is communicative and relates the cognised object to a class (*jati*), thereby determine its nature and making it communicable in propositions.

How are we to understand the seemingly evident statement of the Nyāya philosopher, that erroneous knowledge is based on perception which cognises an attribute as belonging to a thing which doesn't exists in this substance?

To get a better understanding we will go through a simple instance of determinate cognition, in a cognitive relation between a subject and a cognised object, constituted as follows:

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[117] p.101, Mahāmahopāḍhyāya Gaṅgānāṭha Jhā (trans): "*The Nyāya-Sūṭras of Gauṭama, with the Bhāṣya of Vāṭsyāyana and the Vārṭika of Uḍḍyotakara*", Vol.1, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi (1999).

[118] p.102, Gaṅgānāṭha Jhā (trans): "*The Nyāya-Sūṭras of Gauṭama*", Vol.1 (1999)

[119] p.121, Kuppuswami.: "*A Primer of Indian Logic*" (1998).

1) An objective content (*viṣaya*),
2) The cognition itself (*viṣayin*), and
3) The relation between the two (*viṣayaviṣayibhāva*).

This cognitive model comprises two *independent* realities which are connected to each other by the process of cognition. By way of the objectness (*viṣayatā*) an independent object is able to partake in the relation of cognition initiated by its counterpart, subjectness (*viṣayitā*).

In a proposition the object of cognition stated in a simple form is a substantive (*viśeṣya*) and an attribute related to this (*viśeṣaṇa*) and a relation (*saṁsarga*) between these two is combined; for example the proposition: "This cloth is red".

We have cognition of an object which is posited as this thing which is of the nature of cloth, which is further limited as being red. So the attribute of redness to the cloth is just a limiting factor of inherence of redness in the substantive. In this way there is a distinction between cognised object, and the object *apart* from the cognition.

In the case of *erroneous* knowledge (if the cloth is not red) the objective content does not correspond to the realities of redness, the particular red and their relation. The redness belonging to the real redness exists elsewhere, but presently not in conjunction with *this* cloth. So the representation in the cognition is a mixture of two realities, which are caused to be the recollection of real redness in conjunction with the present perception[120].

The Nyāya-system is holding a position of *Satkhyātivāda*, that is, that the object of false knowledge is considered to be real; more specifically the position characterised as *Anyathākhyātivāda*. This means that the object of error (the attribute in question) really exists, but *not* in the thing in which it is perceived, because it is wrongly attributed to *this* thing. The error consists in that the attribute is mistakenly perceived as in this thing and not of another thing in which it is experienced before to exist. In the classical example of a rope taken to be a snake: The snake does really exist but it is mistakenly projected on the similar form of a rope in an instance of a mixed perception.

To summarise: The concepts involved in a determinate cognition refers to a objective reality which we can know because the objects can partake in a cognitive relation, and in case of a erroneous

[120] p.113-122, Kuppuswami Sastra, S.: "*A Primer of Indian Logic*" (1998).

cognition we still cognises something objective although mistakenly attributed in the present situation from a different (previous experienced) context. The metaphysical pluralism here is implied in the division of objective and subjective reality.

Theory of Cognition and Erroneous Knowledge in Śaiva Siddhānta-philosophy

How is the position of Śaiva Siddhānta which, as we have seen, has a more unified sense of being as the Primal Being is the ultimate support of all kinds of beings except the root-*mala*?
The answer to this can *firstly* easily be discerned in the very definition of a *pramāna*, and *secondly* be seen in the concept of the operation of this *pramāna* as the all-pervasive *Śakti* which ultimately is our only way to liberation.

Definition of Pramāna

Śivagrayogin[121] states in his '*Saivaparibhāṣā*' the following definition on a *pramāna*: "*That in the absence of which there is no valid knowledge of anything, that alone should be admitted to be a pramāṇa*"[122]. The only cognitive power fitting this definition is *Citśakti*, the power of the Primal Being operating in the self, and *not* the three otherwise accepted *pramāna*: *Pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*, which Śivagrayogin regards as auxiliaries in establishing valid knowledge. Śivagrayogin give the following reasons for the existence of one true *pramāna*:
1) As there can not be valid knowledge without *Citśakti*; it is not correct to name the auxiliaries as *pramānas*, because these are not able to function without *Citśakti*
2) Because they are *not* free from error as they cannot comprehend that which is beyond the objects and experience, so the three secondary *pramānas* will always implicate possibilities of error and doubt.
3) *Citśakti* is the only active power which is able to, through modification, to reach out to the objects, *without* itself being cognised as an object[123].

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[121] Thirugnanasambandhan supports the view that in Saiva Siddhanta the metaphysics and epistemology is connected in the concept of *Citśakti* as a *pramāna*, and that only Śivagrayogin is a primary source , see p.105-106, and p.113-114, Thirugnanasambandhan: "*The Bearing of Śaiva Siddhanta Epistomology on its Metaphysics*", Indian Philosophical Annual (1980-81)
[122] p.8-9, Suryanarayana Sastri: "*The Saivaparibhāṣā of Śivāgrayogin*" (1982).
[123] p.5-6, Suryanarayana Sastri: "*The Saivaparibhāṣā of Śivāgrayogin*"(1982).

Śivagrayogin argues against the Naiyāyikas, that an *instrument* of knowledge cannot be a *pramāna* on account of that the knowledge of for example a red cloth, is only *dependent* on the functions of the sense organs, which in turn is limited in scope to the field of each individual senses, and therefore cannot be called a genuine *pramāna*[124]. Even in the case of the intellect although synthetic in nature, cannot be called a *pramāna*, because it is subject to objectification (by the experiencing self) and therefore incapable of independent cognition. As opposed to the intellect, *Citśakti*, as an independent *source* of valid knowledge, does, in the state of bondage, turn towards objects through the inner and outer senses, and in this way makes the identification with the object possible. Thus we have two levels of cognition:

1) The level of *infallible* knowledge; accomplished by the pure (self)awareness of consciousness, *Citśakti*, different from doubt, error, and remembrance, and therefore is the only *pramāna*.

2) The level of limited consciousness which produces *fallible* object knowledge; directed towards objects within time and space, that is, within worldly existence which constitute the three (auxiliary) *pramānas*.

Śivagrayogin thus understands *pramāna*, as the infallible source of valid knowledge in an absolute sense, excluding the traditional instrumental view on pramānas, due to the presence of *possibility* of errors inherent in the form of three elements involved in determinate cognitions:

1) *Doubt*; as to whether a certain perception is true or not

2) *Erroneous perception*; a mixed cognition of an object as something which is not the case

3) *Remembrance*; a cognition generated by the impression of prior experience

These three factors makes any certain and true cognition impossible as *a priori* knowledge. It may be true, but it may also be false, and there is no certain method to tell the difference between these two.

Therefore in this sense only what is not affected by these three factors of fallibility can be a *pramāna*. As an unlimited pervasive potency of consciousness *Citśakti* is universally active, and therefore also present within the framework of empirical knowledge of objects, but only in the mode of *attachment* which is the essential constituents of the state of bondage, according to

[124] p.8, Suryanarayana Sastri: "*The Saivaparibhāṣā of Śivāgrayogin*"(1982).

Śivāgrayogin: "*And this intelligence-energy is but the consciousness relating to things. And the fruit of that is the avoidance, acceptance etc., relating to its own content.*"[125].
This means that *Citśakti* is active in the cognitive relation between the cognising consciousness and the cognised object (the external content of cognition), without "over-pervasion", as it does not make this relation between subject and object senseless; the object is still a *real* object. This is crucial for a Saiva Siddhantin as the entire metaphysics is based on the evolutes of *māyā* as *real* and *not* to be reduced to ideas in a cognitive relation.

Now what is the meaning of making the otherwise generally accepted *pramānas* (*pratykṣa*, *anumāna*, *śabda*) auxiliaries or 'helpful instruments' in attaining knowledge, when *Citśakti* is the real *pramāna*?
The answer lays in the concept of *Citśakti* as the cause of all kind of objectifying knowledge, and the division of *a priori* (certain) and *a posteriori* (empirically conditioned) cognitions: The awareness directed through the inner organs and senses towards objects, has, because it is supported by the three auxiliary *pramānas*, the possibility of defective senses and deceitful statements, hence they are *instrumental* of obtaining knowledge and *not* a genuine source of valid knowledge. This means that:
1) The secondary *pramānas* necessary for objective cognition are only regarded as *means*, that is, insentient instruments necessary for cognition to function, but *not* in the proper *causal* sense;
2) The three auxiliary *pramānas* are necessarily subject to *attachments* which distorts the outcome of exercising these instruments;
3) The *pratyakṣa* which forms the basis of the functioning of the other two instruments makes use of the sense organs which are limited to their respective field of objects, and therefore cannot be regarded as a proper cause of cognition.

It is important to note that *Citśakti* is regarded as *pramāna* only when it is turned towards objects; this makes the three auxiliary *pramānas* a necessary condition as they perform the realisation of the potency of the self as *directedness*, within the framework of the evolutes of the impure *māyā*,

[125] As translated in p.8, Suryanarayana: "*The Saivaparibhāṣā of Śivāgrayogin*" (1982). The Sanskrit text is as follows: "Iyaṁ ca cicchaktiḥ padārthaviṣayako bodha eva | tasyāśca phalam svaviṣaye hānopādānādi".

This 'gross' *māyā* is the manifestation from which, as we have seen, the unfolding of time (*kāla*) proceed as the first of five restrictors: Followed by destiny (*nyati*), the limited agency (*kalā*), knowledge (*vidyā*) and attachment (*rāgha*) respectively, as constituting the world within which *Citśakti* can be exercised as a *pramāna.*

Because the *Citśakti* only can be regarded as a source of valid knowledge when it is directed against *objects* in a state of bondage, it means that the *Citśakti* which is *not* directed against objects is *not* a *pramāna* but a *pure apperception* constituting the inherent *union* of *Citśakti* with the self in a (non-actualised) *self-consciousness* untouched by the five restrictors and the five infirmities[126].

Determinate and erroneous perception

The evolutes of knowledge (*vidyā*) manifest the cognitive potency of the individual selves as to make it possible to cognise *determinate* and *indeterminate* perception, and to know these in the process of cognition connected to examination, determination and identification.

Vidyā

In the unfolding of the potencies necessary for the individual self to experience, *vidyā* manifest the cognition in the form of the bare content of cognition, unrelated to any class; this *indeterminate* perception form the foundation of apprehension of the class nature of the object in the *determinate* perception, which can only operate supported by experience in the form of *memory impressions.* Thus these two integral types of perceptions constitute the proper object which is apprehended and which can be made into that with which the self identifies, and consequently that which accordingly is acted upon[127]. The entire cognitive process is made accessible for the individual self as *activities* of the mind, intellect, and ego, which is respectively responsible for examination, determination, and identification of the self in the modus of attachments.

Kalā removes the obscuration of the root-impurity and directs the cognitive potency of the self towards the intellect (*buddhi*). The intellect, which is the highest organ of cognition and the seat of volition, is the basis of a fundamental attachment, which is accessible to the self in the form of objectification of the intellect by the power of *vidyā.*

There are thus two processes constituting an object as such:

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[126] p.12, Suryanarayana Sastri: "*The Saivaparibhāṣā of Śivāgrayogin*" (1982)
[127] p.199, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

1) *External* objectification; the objectifying act of the intellect towards the content of cognition, which results in a proper object perceived in the external world as a *determinate*. The determination is performed on the basis of an *indeterminate* object which functions as the bare content of the directedness of the limited consciousness. *Vidyā* is the activating principle behind the indeterminate perception on which the categorization is applied involving names, classes and impressions of previous experience to form the fully qualified object fit for the experiential presentation to the intellect.

2) *Internal* objectification; the objectifying act which makes the *intellect as such* an object of knowledge itself, in order to make it accessible to the self. The intellect becomes the internal object for the self, thus making it function as an instrument of experience, in the *same* way as senses are instrument of the intellect in the *external* objectification. The insentient intellect itself is modified into one of the three kinds of qualities (*guṇas*) by the *determinate* perception, and therefore is able to reflect its content to the experiencing consciousness. *Only* in this way it is possible for the individual self to experience pleasure and pain as the intellect has the ability to *assume* a form through *vidyā* in order to convey experience to the real experiencer, the self. Cognitive potency as *vidyā* modifies the intellect as to be knowable to the self.

The acts of objectifications in both kind of operations (external and internal objectifications) thus necessarily involves an instrumental power, vidyā, due to the functional limitation of the internal organs which means that they are strictly confined to their specific functions, that is, examination, determination and identification, respectively performed by *mind*, *intellect* and *ego*. What is beyond their designated function needs a designated instrumental cause, that is, some active power causing the self to know these organs of cognition by transforming them in a form fit for cognition in the world of perceptions, actions, emotions, etc.

Rāga

The last of the five evolutes which constitute the limitations of the pervasive consciousness in the world, is *Rāga*. We will deal with this manifestation in detail as this is the focal point of *attention*, and therefore constituting the actual exercising of the cognitive function and the possibilities of erroneous knowledge.

We have previously seen that this potency makes it possible for the individual selves to be attached to the object presented, and as something with which the self can identify[128]. This aspect manifested the "why" of the special directedness of the consciousness as a general potency, as well as the specific attention in our field of possible objects.

Rāga is held to be of two kinds according to their differentiation in function:[129]
1) In form of *sentience*, as that which makes the intellect assume the form of disposition to enjoy the object, that is, the experience of objects by the self as being desirable or the opposite. This is valid for all perceived objects of any kind presented by the intellect, and this is only possible by way of contact between this conative potency of the conscious self realised as a special attachment, and the external object.
2) In the form of residual *impression*, which makes up the mental configuration of the individual self in respect of actualised karma as mental dispositions of the same individual self. This is also a part of the form assumed by the intellect as the perception and presentation of an object, but it *only* defines the object in question, not the driving attachment.

The five restrictors of consciousness displays the experience of the world in a general way; to add another layer of conditions forming the experience in a more *specific* way, we have to consider the five infirmities: Indiscrimination, egoism, longing, desire and aversion[130]. In the condition of the self as associated with senses, and subject to the three *maḷas* (*sakala*), the individual self is A) not able to discriminate between permanence and impermanence; B) from this lack of discrimination follows the identification of egoism; C) which constitute the longing of the self after desired objects; D) which is the basis of aversion toward objects which does *not* lead to the desired object.

From this point the evolvement of *mūlapṛakṭi* and the 24 *tattvas* has been described before as forming the manifestation of the experienced world and the immediate and mediate causal evolutes, as the basis of matter, sense organs, motor organs and internal organs of the individual selves.

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[128] p.59, this paper.
[129] p.204, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).
[130] p.207-210, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985).

In this way we have an understanding of the operational condition of the three fallible secondary *pramānas* in a world which manifests the five constricttors and the five infirmities, manifesting in the gross world in which cognition of objects actually takes place.
The cognition of objects is always subject to powers which make the erroneous knowledge a possibility, due to *defects* of sense organs, *doubt* in examining the object, and the *fallible* remembrance. Even in the process of object-cognition itself there is an inherent problem of attachment and desire which cannot be disposed of because there would be not cognition of objects without it.

The above described *pancakañcukas* constitute the finitude of the pure pervasive consciousness in the world of objects and language; they are regarded as the sheaths in which the self is wrapped in a timely existence which makes up the stages of descending manifestations of beings forming the impermanent world.
These descending levels of beings are possible because of the causal relations of *satkaryavāda*, the existence of the effect in its cause prior to its operation in the effect. This ensures the working of potency and actualisation as a mechanism of the dynamics of the evolutes of the world, as an unbroken chain of what is manifested in the world to its prior potential form. Thus the operation of the inherent powers in the world makes it possible for Saiva Siddhantists to state the existential proof of God as the first instrumental cause, in an unfolding series of causes and effects, of the whole manifested world, pure as well as impure.

By way of modification or restriction the cognitive power of the pervasive knowledge is formed to reveal objects in a world of volitions, conations and cognitions; in this way the darkness is pierced with the light of objects by the power of *Citśakti*. This partially ignorance is driven the pervasive cognitive power in the form of *objects* in the world, but initially *Citśakti* is a priori true and knows everything; therefore we can determine objective knowledge as: A bringing forth beings from the veiling power of *āṇava maḷas*.
Potentially we already know, but true knowledge is *hidden* from us to make it accessible for us in the form of *objects*. This is the proper function of the insentient intellect: To modify knowledge so as to make it accessible for consciousness in terms of piercing the darkness.

Erroneous knowledge

If absolute truth is that which is described as the pervasive cognition of the self, what is then is defined as truth in the realm of objects? Can we, like the Naiyāyikas, talk about truth as a *correspondence* between two entities brought in connection with each other in a relation of cognition by the cognizing subject?

By the full knowledge of an object represented in the intellect, constituted by the activity of the restrictors and the working of the infirmities, the objects are presented to us. If we are to preserve both the a priori level and the a posteriori level of cognition, then we must accept that a field of awareness defines the light of being in which we are able to discover objects. Because of this field there is the possibility of transforming truth to objects which can be presented in valid or in erroneous knowledge. The transformation of pure being to objects makes cognition subject to error in two ways:

1) In the transformation from pure being (through concealment and projection on the field of awareness) to the original immediate givenness as indeterminate perception, the correct presentation of the object is dependent on the senses, and therefore subject to any defects in the relevant sense organs.

2) In the second transformation from the original indeterminate presentation of an object to the determinate cognition, the valid knowledge of the object is dependent on the correct examination and remembrance, so the object is known without distortion or defects in memory and ability to apply general concept to particulars.

Given these conditions the true knowledge of a red piece of cloth is true *if* the prior givenness of the object in the actual *indeterminate* aspect of the pure phenomenon presents a cloth-quality and a red-quality, and is examined and judged in the *determinate* perception as an objects consisting of a piece of cloth-substratum *there*, with the distinct attributes of being a textile and possessing a red colour, in accordance with previous experience with similar objects.

The full truth must be the related to what is presented by the intellect on the basis on prior operation of the senses, through the indeterminate perception, and the recollection, examination and determination of the relevant internal organs, and the final decision of the intellect itself. The

possible errors are connected to the indeterminate perception, the impressions due to prior experiences, and the actual configuration of the emotional preferences of attention and volition.

Without the establishment of two independent substances (subject and object) as in the Nyāya-epistemology, the realistic base of an object can be maintained, but *only* as a posterior modification of the original given object as object-actualisation of pure being. The erroneous knowledge must be an operational factor as the defective process of cognition in the full perspective of the situation. A complete realistic correspondence model comprising and independent subject apprehending an independent object is *not* possible within the framework of Śaiva Siddhānta, as the *same* being from an *absolute* point of view is present in *all* the three aspect of a cognitive relation: The knower, the known as well as the knowledge itself.
In this way it is possible to state both that the objects are real at a relative level, while preserving the advaitic relationship between the Primal Being and the selves on an absolute level.

The *directedness* of the consciousness in the three states constitutes the true object; only in relation to the communicative determination of the given object, for example as having the characteristics of a cloth or possessing redness, that an erroneous knowledge can surface. As there is no absolute correlate to the full presentation of the object, then there cannot be absolute criteria of erroneous knowledge contra valid knowledge as this can only be done in a pragmatic fashion of non-contradiction.

A more comprehensive understanding have to transcend the traditional objective conditions; it can only be done by defining the field of objects as what is perceived in a state of *discrimination*, non-egoism, longing for liberation, and without desire and aversion. This statement points to a state of stillness of mind and the possibility of obtaining pure awareness, although *still* in the world of objects, but in the modus of *self-evidence*; the self-evidence of objects as they reveal themselves to the self when stillness of the mind is obtained – in this state there cannot be any methodological formal approach which secures truth; truth is here elevated spiritual *existence*. Thus the definition of valid and invalid knowledge ultimately leads back to the question of an adequate concept of *being*.

Comparison of the views of Nyāya and Śaiva Siddhānta

If we compare with the elaborate schemes in Nyāya theory of knowledge concerning truth and true cognition we will notice a number of factors which sets Śaiva Siddhānta apart from the views of the Naiyāyikas. Both can be regarded as realists in their view on the world, but the realism of Naiyāyikas is very different from that of Śaiva Siddhānta, as we have seen, and that makes the theory of truth and error, on the side of Naiyāyikas more adaptable to a traditional correspondence model than that of Śaiva Siddhānta, especially in the formulation of Śivagrayogin summarised below:

1) Śivagrayogin defines a *pramāna* in terms of a *denial* of the relevance of its instrumentality, on account of its nature of being conditioned, and further that a source of valid knowledge cannot be an object of knowledge itself, since this means that the *pramāna* itself must be known through another *pramāna*. A true criteria of being a pramāna is thus that it has to be:

a) A genuine *cause*

b) A *sentient* entity which cannot be a part of the objectified system of cognition itself

c) *Independent*, not conditioned

d) Generating *only* true knowledge

The definition of a *pramāna* by Naiyāyikas is not based on a priori knowledge as Śivagrayogin maintains, but only as that which is the instrument of obtaining valid knowledge in terms of correspondence between two independent realities, provided some conditions are being fulfilled, like no defects in sense organs or occurrence of mixed perceptions.

2) The lack of distinction by Śivagrayogin between *empirical* relative and absolute cognition, which makes it possible for him to demand absolutely certainty of a *pramāna*, as opposed to making the relative or conditioned world of objects the proper field of the function of a *pramāna*.

3) In Śaiva Siddhānta the role of *Śakti*, as we have seen, plays a crucial role in the operation of the Primal Being in the world through a series of operational levels of powers, making it possible for the Primal Being to counter the effects of *āṇava maḷa*. In this scheme the function of *citśakti* is an element in the Grace of Primal Being to operate *directly* in the self, as the light which dissolves the darkness of *āṇava maḷa*.

This power is not present in the philosophy of Naiyāyikas as their cognitive model is based on two independent beings which by their own nature accomplish the cognitive relation.

4) Śaiva Siddhānta insists on the role of *citśakti* as operating in the self, thereby making the cognition of objects only a *modification* of a pervasive awareness of the consciousness. The role of pure consciousness is therefore significant, while the role of cognition of objects is limited in that it is wholly dependent on absolute true knowledge of which it is a deprivation.
In Nyāya-philosophy knowledge of objects is true in its own level, and this has a decisive role to play as this kind of knowledge leads to liberation.

5) Śaiva Siddhānta holds that the Prima Being, via His *Śakti*, is in an inseparable relationship with the self, as also the inner association of self with its intellect.
This is opposed to Nyāya-philosophy which is based on the importance of a multiplicity of independent substances operating on each other.

6) The self is, in Śaiva Siddhānta, of the nature of pervasive knowledge and pure consciousness, and *not* a quality which is added to the self in the state of bondage, as Naiyāyikas hold.

7) Nyāya holds that a cognition is a relation between an outside generated objective content of cognition and its subjective cognisor; such a relation between two independent substances of which the sentient part involve the objective part, is not possible in Śaiva Siddhānta, as the object is a modification of pure being in the field of pure consciousness, both of which is 'artificially' separated by operative forces for the sake of the elevation of the self, resulting in a matrix of possible cognitions of objects. Thus the separation of subject and object is not absolute and cannot form the basis of a certain delineation of valid and invalid cognition; only grades of comparison on a relative level makes sense in the world of non-being.

8) Errors in perceptional knowledge are due to mixed perceptions according to Nyāya-epistemology, but in Śaiva Siddhānta the erroneous knowledge is being generated by the sense organs, memory, mind and intellect. Thus our possibility of knowing is problematic and can never be certain, as described in the paragraph about the acceptance of only *one* primary *pramāna*; the

actualisation of this *pramāna* has always an inherent indecisiveness in the function of cognition of objects.
In Nyāya certain knowledge is secured in the activity of two different kind of substances in a cognitive relation based on the rules of true knowledge.

8) The explanation of the Nyāya position regarding the cause of erroneous knowledge is named *Anyathākhyātivāda*, which refers to errors due to mixing of things which is similar and which really *do* exists. This is partly consistence with the position of Śaiva Siddhānta which also states that erroneous knowledge based on perception is *real*, but it is regarded to be present in a non-existent relation, which is consistence with their realist standpoint, as opposed to the doctrines of Advaita Vedānta which hold that erroneous knowledge to be wholly non-existent

In bondage consciousness is directed against objects, while the pervasive awareness has no objects[131]. Thus in the limited objectifying knowledge in bondage based on perception, Śaiva Siddhānta also distinguish between indeterminate and determinate perception; the former is cognition devoid of relation to concepts and classes, the latter is when the relation to concepts and classes has been accomplished. The external and internal sense organs constitute the experience of objects, as opposed to the fundamental awareness of itself, the pure self-consciousness. It is the connection with the *tattvas* or evolutes of *māyā,* that limits the unified awareness to the effect of perceiving objects.

Now in this and the previous three paragraphs we examined the theory of knowledge of Śaiva Siddhānta, especially in relation to valid and invalid knowledge, and their instruments, constituents and original source. This has brought once again the aspect of *metaphysics* in terms of the modes of being and beings, to our attention, as a support of cognition in both a broad and more specific sense; as the *reality* in the form of consciousness and absolute being, and as a *modification* of this reality to bring forth the specific conditions of valid and invalid knowledge of a given object.

[131] p.12-19, Jayammal: "*The Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya of Śivāgrayogin*" (1993)

Before we once again take up the question of being and knowledge, we need to take a look on the presence of absence in the world, and in what form we may understand the phenomenon of consciousness in its worldly aspect.

Theory of Non-Being and Consciousness

We have examined the metaphysical condition of our being in the world, and described how it is possible for us to know something, but we need to have an understanding of how consciousness shows itself in the world. We will briefly summarise what is said up to this point: The consciousness is essentially an all-cognitive power which has been modified to function in the impure evolutes of māyā. These impure evolutes constitute experience of the self in a timely existence exercising the power of cognition, volition and desire. The pure consciousness operates in the mode of directedness toward objects, experiencing these objects in the context of the world which is the field of what can be understood as objectifying revelation of being.

The world is thus considered to be a *remedy* to the absolute veiling function of *āṇava maḷa* which hides the consciousness of the self from itself. The consciousness and self-consciousness are still there, but in a modus of concealment, making the association of self and inner cognitive organs necessary. When thus in a state of association it causes the five states of consciousness to manifest: Waking state (in which the sense organs are active), dream state (in which the mind and memory are active), sleeping state (in which the indeterminate mode of the mind and the vital air function are active), the fourth state (in which only the residual function of the vital air is active), and the state beyond the fourth (in which not even the vital air function is active).

The *āṇava maḷa* means the power of darkness, while the *māyā* means the power of light in the form of unveiling objects in the first two states of consciousness, on the basis of the last three states of consciousness. The states of consciousness can be viewed as matching the evolution of the manifest world, as correlates of the descending of the evolutes of *māyā*, to the grossest element of the world. The ability of the self to be in an inseparable relationship with the forms presented by the intellect constitutes *both* ignorance and the means of liberation.

The means of liberation lies in the function of *āṇava maḷa* as having potencies and capable of operating on individual selves[132]. The self is related to both being and absence of being, and in this state *māyā* is caused to operate through *tirodhāyi* (the power of concealment), and *bindu* (the initial power of the manifested creation)[133].

The particular effect of *āṇava maḷa* is only limited to the *individual* selves which means that it cannot have any effect on the universal or pervasive aspect of the self, only the appearance of self as *individual*. The individual selves are always in the presence of the pervasive self, even in the states of complete isolation[134]. That is why the working of the powers of the Primal Being is still active while the self is under the influence of *āṇava maḷa*. In the seventh sūtra, statement three, it is said that the self is *neither* pure being nor non-being, making the existence of the self a peculiar kind of existence who knows *both*, though, in two different ways; the knowledge of *āṇava maḷa* as related to in the form of the individual self, and the knowledge of the Primal Being as related to in the form of pervasive self, due to its ability of having relations and of identifying with the nature of the things it apprehends.
These specific abilities produce the self-awareness in the world as the *consciousness of knowing that it knows*. This kind of understanding constitute our being as a distance to ourselves, as continuing delay of the presence of the individual self, and therefore the means by which we are able to escape the world.

Thus, as we will further substantiate in the following chapter, the worldly consciousness is showing itself as *intentional*, that is, directedness toward objects, by means of a series of modification of a pure awareness, in the world. The ability to tie this directedness together in a unifying self is performed by the synthetic function of *pure apperception*. We will make an attempt to reinterpret the metaphysics of the western tradition which is otherwise alienated to a concept of reality, but which also bears the imprint of this absence in the form of the consequences of this denial.

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[132]
[133] p.266, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)
[134] p.190, Suryanarayana: "*The Śaivaparibhāṣā of Śivāgrayogin*" (1982)
p.266, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)

We will no turn towards an examination of ignorance in terms of a metaphysical based epistemology, that is, a revisiting of the previous covered phenomenon of ignorance in the light of findings in the epistemological field in this chapter.

Ignorance (2)

In the previous chapter we learned from the third sūtra that the self was neither identical with the Supreme Being nor with the inner organs of cognitions (mind or intellect). Analysing the fourth sūtra, statement one, we have learned that the self was: Sentient, conscious of objects, and conscious of that it was conscious[135]. In the state of bondage the self is subject to the limitation of the empirical world, which is of the nature of the insentient *māyā*, and which cannot be explained as mere illusion as the world and its evolutes are *real*, and that the *āṇava maḷa* is a *positive* potency obscuring the consciousness of the individual self. We also examined the theory of knowledge of Śaiva Siddhānta from the perspective of the empirical world, as in a state of limiting modification of the pervasive *citśakti*, the one true *pramāna*. We know about the evolutes which constitute the empirical world, and the objectifying knowledge which is the foundation of possibility of true or false knowledge.

The ignorance as implied in the state of bondage is *not* false knowledge as something which can be corrected with true knowledge; ignorance can only be dispensed with through realising an entirely different form of *existence*.

Now if ignorance is not erroneous knowledge and not compatible with the pervasive knowledge, then how are we to understand this nature of ignorance in a metaphysical context?

The Metaphysical Foundation of Ignorance

In the fifth sūtra, statement one, it is said that the self only can cognise through the five senses by *identifying* with them and thus know the object[136]. This is a clear statement of the inclusiveness of the self in terms of identification or inseparable relation, which is contrary to the position held by the Sāṅkhyas in which the self, *puruṣa*, is absolute passive and untouched by the evolutes of *prakṛti*, thus making the intellect (*buddhi*) the active part in the ignorance of *puruṣa*. In Śaiva Siddhānta the self is *part* in the cognitive process and the misconception of its own nature.

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[135] p.28, this paper.
[136] p.281-282, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)

It is said in seventh sūtra, statement three, that the cause of ignorance cannot affect *citśakti*; only the *individual* selves can have a relation to *āṇava maḷa*. The self remains identified with both *sat* and *asat*, which in turn defines the individual self in its existence, that is, its mode of being in the world[137]. When the senses, mind and intellect shows the self objects, and the self is shown this by way of identification with the shown, then the self cannot be taught of its own true nature by the intellect or the other internal cognitive organs, as they only know of their own designated object. Thus the self *cannot* by itself learn of its own nature by discriminating between self and non-self - which lies at the root of ignorance; it has to have a higher level of understanding to escape ignorance[138].

The self's liberation from ignorance lies *beyond* the knowledge of the world, *asat*, as there must be some power to establish a realisation of its own true nature. This aspect will be discussed in a later chapter as it reveals a dynamics of being which is rooted in the ignorance itself, but first our immediate task here is to find the *structure of ignorance* which is the foundation of the possibility of liberation.

Pure and Empirical Apperception

We learned from seventh sūtra, statement three, that the self is the being which knows in two radically different ways, and that this being is also capable of assuming the nature of the entities it identifies with - and what is most important: That the self in the moment of liberation knows that it knows the two kinds of relation (to being and *āṇava maḷa*) as part of its own being in the world. The structure of ignorance which makes liberation possible is thus found in the *pure apperception*, the self-consciousness which is aware of itself:

> "The self thinks (with the grace of the spiritual master) how the self displays in itself the nature of the objects that are revealed by the sense organs. Thus it discriminates its general nature which is the result of its identification with the sense-organs and becomes identified with the Primal Being in order to perceive its true nature"[139]

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[137]
[138] p.335, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)
[139] p.354, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)
p.354, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)

Here the spiritual power of the Primal Being is reflecting on itself, that is, its empirical nature as far as its general nature is concerned (in bondage), and this reflection, or pure apperception (self-knowledge) reveals that it is not an object like the objects shown in the empirical state, but that it is something in which its experience as such is reflected, and in this realisation of itself the liberation is achieved.
Now it may be asked: If the self-consciousness is representing the universal self, and this new identification brings about liberation, what then is the nature of self-consciousness?

First we need to differentiate between two different states of consciousness which represents two different *forms* of identification: Pure self-consciousness and empirical object-consciousness:
1) *Pure* consciousness is free from duality and the world's objects, contemplating only what is beyond, that is, itself, or being in essence.
2) *Empirical* consciousness which only understands non-being, the diversified world of objects.

It is the same consciousness whether it is pure or empirical, but the pure consciousness constitutes the function of the empirical consciousness. The working of the empirical consciousness is shown in the description of the states of consciousness, each having its own proper function and objects; the self is of course the same but the associated *tattvas* is different.

In the moment of liberation the false empirical nature which is occupied with identification with the objects of the empirical world will be revealed by the previously obscured pure consciousness, to the effect of *realisation of the new identification* - and in that moment the destruction of the object-identification, the empirical consciousness will loose its function as its objects will loose their meaning.
It may be objected that this interpretation is a doubling of consciousness, but by 'pure consciousness' is only meant as that which necessarily supports the function of the empirical directedness, but unrealised and therefore not visible or directly cognisable.

This is also supported by the metaphysical statement that self is that kind of being which is characterised as *sadasat*, both being and non-being, or capable of identifying with either being and non-being. In the movement of the individual self realising its true nature is *becomes* being, *sat*.

Thus *knowledge* in its highest forms transforms being; the self is not anymore identified with *asat*, but in this new realised state is now identified with *sat*[140].

The working of self-consciousness is presented in the following way:

> "When the self sees, what it sees, as asat and thus rejects it, and then searches for sat in its own consciousness and realises the Lord, then it rids itself of the defect of the old"[141]

Because the pervasive *citśakti* potency is active in the self, the pure self-consciousness is able to manifest itself and *transcend* the empirical consciousness and its constituents. In that movement the knowledge arises in which it realises itself as a pervasive nature, as opposed to its false empirical nature, and in that moment the empirical consciousness is negated and the relation to non-being is destroyed – and so is the relation to the root-impurity, *āṇava maḷa*. By the operation of the force of being the knowledge arises and negates, the relation to impurity is destroyed and the real being is realised.

In the perspective of the absolute, (self)consciousness and truth is *one*. In this perspective the pure self-consciousness apprehends both empirical objects as reflective in the individual self, and pure being, that is, is own inner core. Self-consciousness recovers *truth*, this is the only way we can know true being; otherwise we would only be able to be occupied in dealing with objects, with absolutely no means to acquire the necessary perspective in which we discover the limits of our conditions and the presence of a universal being. Self-consciousness as individually founded even in the context of social interaction (as a common belief in western philosophy) is an impossibility; the constitution of self-consciousness *cannot* be founded in itself, only in a *universal* being as that which leads us to transcends ourselves in the empirical individualised state.

Note on Kant's Concept of Pure Apperception

With the concept of self-consciousness as the principle of knowledge of being and the possibility of liberation, we will now turn to Kant for a western interpretation of this transforming event, and to further develop the critique of the essential nature of modern western philosophy.

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[140] p.368, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)
[141] p.368, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)

In this setting Kant develops his concept of pure and empirical self-consciousness[142]. The perception of diverse objects and its synthesis in the form in which experience function, as apprehension of objects in a structured world, must derive its transcendental unity from a unity of a transcendental consciousness: The pure apperception. The empirical apperception as inner self-consciousness is subject to the fleeting, changing states of empirical consciousness, and cannot constitute a 'standing' self.

The pure, changeless apperception is the transcendental condition of every inner and outer empirical experience, making both perception and conceptual application of the perception possible, as the unitary identity of the consciousness, which is a correlate and condition of the organisation of the structure of the world. If there were not such a unity of consciousness as self-consciousness, there would be nothing but a chaos of perceptions and apprehensions. The perceptions and the application of concepts on perceptions as the synthesis in objects, is only possible because they refer to a unitary consciousness, and this is brought about by the pure self-consciousness.

So Kant sees the pure apperception as a transcendental condition of all experience, and the ultimate foundation of the unity of the ego. But in Kant's philosophy this can only be founded in the ego itself, as there is no transcending entity or function to support the consciousness; the ego must be self-constituted as there is no further discernable being to refer to, as the concept of universal being or being as such, can only be derived in two ways:

1) As a *being in itself*, the unknown independent being which hides behind the phenomenal world

2) As a *being within the world* of objects and ideas, in which all being is submitted to the forms and categories of subject.

Both propositions are problematic; the *first* because of the principle of non-cognition of any independent reality; the *second* proposition because of the definition of reality in the empirical world is only in regards of empirically founded experience, definitely excluding reality as that which truly *is*.

Thus Kant obtained a concept of absolute certain knowledge, but only at the expense of a reality, which is deprived of any meaning or function, as a empty residuum nowhere to be found.

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[142] p.A106-A114, Kant: "*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*" (1974)

The Being of Self in Bondage: Relation and Openness

The self is a being that identifies with objects and is pervaded by the power of *citśakti*, which is capable of having relations to both being and concealment of being, and which knows each of the two kinds of beings through fundamentally different modes of cognitions. The pervasive awareness is a power emerging from the source of the Primal Being, but is subject to the limited objectifying knowledge as a modification of that power by the three *maḷas*. All this has now been established.

Paśu, the self in the state of bondage, is thus a creature *related* to both being and non-being, and it can therefore be characterized as non-complete or indeterminate, that is, *open*. It has a potential for being, but none the less actual in relation to *āṇava maḷa*; therefore we can also characterise the self as something which is subject to a movement in *time*: As being *not-yet-realised*. What is the cause of this strange actuality?

The existence of *āṇava maḷa* or the concealment of consciousness, is here not a satisfying answer, because we are not a being which is accidentally confined by *āṇava maḷa* as a quality which is added to the self, but we are such creatures which *essentially* are left in the darkness from a beginningless time, preventing us from knowing that we pervades the world and are pervaded by Śiva, the Supreme God. We are not accidentally left in the dark, because we have always been there; we have never known anything else. We are pervaded by Śiva and His Grace in a *unrealised* form, and this unrealised relation makes us capable of a *relation to an obscurity* which we can only be liberated from by the benevolent forces in the state of bondages. *We are defined by what we have not-yet-become*, and therefore necessary is a timely being, as we can only be realised *within* the unfolding of time.

This means that releasing the intentionality of our consciousness, that is, our directedness of our being towards something our self reflects (objects), can be viewed as in two *perspectives*:
1) As not-yet-realised *liberation*; in our unrealised non-separable relation with Śiva
2) As actual *bondage*; in our realised non-separable relation to *objects*.
In these two aspects our condition is viewed in two different ways: That of *potentiality* and that of *actuality*, or that of possibility and that of necessity:

We are in a state of *bondage*, but our inner purpose is *transcendence*. This world is thus a ladder for us to climb to a point of liberation, which seems to be a negation of all ladders. How is this possible?

In the field between potentiality for liberation, and actuality of bondage there is a potential relation to be actualised as being. Openness lies in the non-realisation of what is hidden; in a striving towards a state which is a negation of everything we think we know. Only in the realisation lies the *completeness*. This purpose is expressed in the world both as its inner structure of *time*, and at the heart of the modified cognitive faculty of the self: *Language*.

Our timely relational being is openness, and our openness is expressed in the timely directedness of consciousness towards the world - and in the *ambiguity* of language which is a part of both our striving for *completion*, and our actual state of *ignorance*.

Truth in the Light of Bondage

In the chapter about the theory of knowledge we learned that that truth can be viewed from different angels:

1) Truth as a realisation of the true nature of the self in the state of liberation
2) Truth as the transcendental condition as the givenness of the field of possible objects as the foundation of valid and invalid knowledge
3) Truth as that which completes the fulfilment of the indeterminate perception in the determinate perception; the determination of an object which matches with its prior phenomenon. If the evaluation of the pure phenomenon of the object reflects the specific presentation of the intellect, then there is a case of truth in the match of these two instances.
4) Truth as inferential truth where the prediction of an unseen phenomenon is found in the invariable concomitance of the selected markers and the unseen phenomenon. The truth here lies in the verification of the case inferred.

The first meaning is connected to the *absolute* aspect; the second to a *transcendental* aspect; while the two last meanings operates on an *empirical* level in which experience must be active.
All these aspects of reality are related: The inferential prediction of experience is based on experiential knowledge; the matching of judgement and the phenomenon being examined is

constituted by the function of the intellect and memory in relation to the prior indeterminate object; the actual instances of valid or invalid knowledge is made possible by the field of possible objects by the source of the objectifying knowledge or identification; and this in turn is conditioned by the pure *citśakti* which is the operative cognitive power of the Primal Being.

In the paragraph about the metaphysical foundation of ignorance we examined the possibility of liberation from the state of bondage and found that the self-consciousness was the structural feature of our being which hold the key to the possibility of liberation[143]. We also posed a question about the aspect of the state of bondage which makes it possible for the individual self to make statements about non-ignorance and pervasive awareness. The self-consciousness serves the function as that which makes it possible for us to transcend our empirical existence. The necessary condition is that we have a pure self-consciousness which constitutes the empirical consciousness, and which is derived from the working of *citśakti* in our being. We also stated that it is crucial for Śaiva Siddhānta to posit the perspective of the absolute, where being, (self)consciousness and truth is *one* to accentuate the state of bondage as real, while insisting on the actual realisation of liberation as truth.
But how are we able to cognise the existence of a pure self-consciousness and the realisation of its potential when we are in the condition of bondage? Which features or structures in our worldly existence make it possible to talk meaningful about the absolute, pervasive truth?
The manifestation of a spiritual guru in the self is possible by the power of the Prima Being, but in which way are we able to reflect this incompatible movement in the midst of ignorance and our identification with the empirical world?

By posing such a question we ask for the *meaning* of the pervasive awareness as *reflected* in the state of ignorance; in other words: We try to conceive of the *absolute* in terms of the *objectifying* knowledge. This is done by way of he pure self-consciousness because of which we are able to turn our consciousness *towards itself* in a conscious reflection. In terms of Śaiva Siddhānta this can only be done with the help of Śiva's *Śakti* or His Grace. In this chapter we try to interpret this activity of Śiva in terms of the world.

[143] p.92-94, this paper.

With our self's identification with the evolutes of *māyā*, we have the opportunity to be guided to *gradually* remove obstacles to truth in identification with ever more *subtle* objects, in reflection of what we in our heart longs to become. In this way we indeed have a relation to our possible *future*: In the movement of realising the pervasive knowledge in the seemingly incompatible world, *we here and now* transcends our empirical limitations.
Therefore truth can exist in the scriptures and testimonies as a truth transcending the three forms of time, and we are able to long for liberation and envision and embrace what is given as only possible. Because we exist in a timely world of unfolding possibilities we *ourselves can realise that possibility f*ollowing the directedness towards the Primal Being through the three modus of time: Facticity, actuality and possibility (as not-yet-realised).
From a phenomenological (worldly) standpoint we have to review the concept of truth and being as it appears in the world, and discover how it can be acted upon as a means to liberation. In terms of world the question arises as to the *meaning* is of truth, or rather: How does absolute truth appear in the world of ignorance?

Truth is thus connected to being in *pure* form, but has to be expressed in a *gross* form, in the medium of *language* and *action*. The connection of meaning of an expression, and the idea in the mind, is defined in relation to an ideal truth. The reflection of this pure ideal in the language of ignorance, that is, the communication of knowledge inflicted with the gross world, is countered by the working of the ideal form of the word in *Śruti*, *Smṛti*, and the practice of yoga and mantra which stills the mind and reminds us of our divine nature. Language shows us the way out of bondage by mediating between ideal eternal meaning and the ever changing gross form op the world.

Our *ambiguous* situation is a reflection of the projected ideal of absolute truth back in our timely existence: Like the mirroring of the existence and powers of the pure *māyā* into the evolutes of the impure *māyā* in the metaphysical aspect, so also the ideal of truth is mirrored back in the world of deceptions, as a theory of knowledge. By way of identifying with *what is not-yet*, we assimilate this ideal state of absolute truth:

Actuality		**Possibility**
State of ignorance	←→	Absolute state (negation of ignorance)

The relation between ignorance and the pervasive absolute knowledge works both ways:

1) The projection of the state of ignorance into a possible state of *negation* of ignorance, and
2) The projection of the possible state (of realisation) back onto the world as that which *can* be attained *in spite* of our condition.

In the commentary to ninth sūtra, statement three, in *Śivajñānabodha*, there is proposed a shift of perspective: In the process of transformation towards liberation, the self is "leaving the service of the self" to the state of "standing in the service of the Lord"[144].
Here the self *mirrors* the Primal Being by which he is pervaded, thereby destroying the individual self and accepting the pure being as the highest principle of its self. In the eleventh sūtra, statement one, it is said that:

> "As God knows His own Bliss, through the mirror of the self, it cannot be considered to be tarnished by the fallacy of atmasrya as what is seen as the image in the mirror is really the object."[145]

Here it is stated *the reverse* of the above mentioned is also true: That of the movement of the *absolute* to the state of the realised self replacing the individual self with the universal self, and *experiencing itself through this self*. When the self's sacrifices itself, its associated body and its actions to the Lord, the self become a mirror to the *absolute*: The being of the self has become a *being of a mirror* .

In accordance with this multiple reflection of mirrors we can briefly summarise the process of liberation as instalment of the *absolute* in place of the limited self:
1) The appearance of the *Satguru* in the self as a spiritual master, to guide the self towards liberation[146]
2) The awakening of the pure *self-consciousness* of the self by way of pure spiritual vision, to separate the self from the world, and to realise the inseparable relation between self and Primal Being[147]. In this stage the objectifying knowledge is transcended and abandoned.
3) The *enforcement* of purification is done by practising the utterance of the five holy syllables[148].

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145 p.361, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)
146 p.390, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)
147 Sūtra 8, statement 2, p.38-39, this paper.
Sūtra 8, statement 4, p.39, and sūtra 9, statement 1, p.40, this paper.

4) The condition of the service of the self is *replaced* by the service of the Lord as a realisation of the inseparable realisation between the self and Primal Being in the second stage. As the self has conquered the identification with objects and the body, the world is still there but has no power over the self. This constitutes the shifting perspective of reflections: The Lord's union with the self (as opposed to the self's union of the Lord), or the shifting perspective of the mirror and image reflected[149].

5) The Primal Being is installed firmly in the self as the experience of the *absolute* in the self as pure Bliss. In this last state the self only knows being, and not non-being, and as implied by the above quotation, this pure Bliss is experienced by the Primal Being *through* His Śakti in inseparable union with the pure self.

These five stages of elevation of the self to the final state of liberation, means that the being of the self is transformed through the knowledge of the truth. The longing of the individual self in the state of bondage is thus determined by what it is and reflects from its own pure being. The transformation itself is due to a knowledge which is *not* knowledge of words; it is *beyond* language and forms.

As language belongs to the limited knowledge and objects of the world, what is the role of this medium by which all our thoughts and actions are inflicted? Towards what kind of objects do the words in the scriptures point to - in the midst of the world of ignorance?

Language and Creation

Language is a modification of reality in which we partake as beings who shares a common ground of *reality*, and due to this fact we are capable of understanding and communicating with each other. In the phenomenon of reflection of the pure knowledge into the state of bondage, the language plays a crucial role: As words is a part of the *gross* world it is a part of the limitations inherent in this, but as a part of the pure ideal meanings it may leads to liberation.

In the commentary to the first sūtra, statement one, we learned that the nature of the world is subject to gender: *he*, *she*, *it*. This meant that there was an intimate connection between world and language. It was stated by Śivagrayogin that the special structure of the objects constitute the

[148] Sūtra 9, statement 3, p.41, this paper.
[149] Sūtra 10, statement 1 and 2, p.42, this paper.

similarity of attributes; that the world of objects reflects the world of names and attributes[150]. By what feature is the nature of words and objects said to be *similar*? The answer is that it is the nature of having parts, or being *effects* of a cause – and *not* some instruments that Man has invented for cognition of particulars. Language and world reflects each other because they have a common *source*, and this common source is connected to the working of the *Śakti* of Śiva.

Sphota: The Potency of Language

In the chapter dealing with Śiva's *Śakti* and the evolutes of pure *māyā* we mentioned that this pure *māyā* has two natures, that of words and that of substances[151].

Our point of focus is now the role of language as opposed to the previous examination of evolutes of the object-world. We mentioned before five forms of *Śakti* operating on the pure *māyā* which are the cause of the manifestations in respect of the pure *māyā*: *Nada* (sound), *bindu* (conative potency), *sadaśiva* (absorbs and activates), *īsvara* (subtle activity), and *vidyā* (state of gross activity). The definition of cause and effect in this context is that the cause is in the form of *potency*, and the effect is the form of *manifestation*. This is also true of the manifestation of language which derives its nature from the pure *māyā*[152].

The conceptual potency has its origin in the power of *nada* (the cognitive potency), which in turn is the cause of manifestation of all kinds of cognition. In respect to the language this makes the expression of words (*vaikhari*) to be able to manifest their *ideal* meaning, in spite of that their gross expressions is composed of individual letters and syllables; this is due to the conceptual potency of the words, named *sphota*.

When the syllables of the word is uttered, the potency of this word is activated and the ideal meaning of the word is activated and revealed to us in a unitary experience; this meaning springs forth in our mind by the power of *sphota*, and this potency is operating in the purest realms of creation. The objects that a word points to, is revealed to us by *nada*, but this pure source of

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150 p.8-11, Jayammal: "The Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya of Śivāgrayogin" (1993)
151 p.16, and p.70, this paper.
152 p.246/21-246/22, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)

language due to the expressions in the gross world and the fact that words points to objects, can only reveal the appropriate objects which the potency connects to this particular word.
The *nadi-śakti* as a conceptual potency, is the cause of the expression of language in the gross world, so that in the pronunciation of which the potency is able to manifest meanings, thus revealing the objective reality which is connected to the world since the beginning of time. This is said to be a *partially* manifestation on the side of the expression, so that this partial transformation of potency into the expression as effect, makes the utterance of the expression to be quite different from other kinds of sounds, in that they perform the revealing of the meaning *pointing* to an object through the causal potency which was not transformed into that expression[153].

In this way Śaiva Siddhānta accounts for the expressions of language as conveying an *ideal* meaning manifesting as a *whole*, in the minds of the speakers and the hearers, in spite of the limited and gradual forming of syllables, words, sentences and the entire body of a text or a series of utterances. By the *Śakti* of the Primal Being the ideality of language is retained even in the world of gross objects, making language a unique *manifestation of God* in midst of ignorance - in a modified way, though, as the language is directed towards objects bringing these from the state of obscurance to be partially *revealed* in the light of the *citśakti*.

Language is the link between us and the absolute, which is accessible in the world and operated by way of a subtle web of meanings and expressions in a multiplicity of connected dimensions.

Metaphysics of Language

We have seen in a previous chapter the difference on indeterminate and determinate cognition; indeterminate cognition based on the pure perception of an object, and determinate knowledge based on conceptual knowledge, which is preceded by the activity of the memory, examination of the mind, and fully presented by the intellect to the self.
In *examination*, *classifying* and *judging* the concepts are used as necessary instruments; this is not to be regarded as an additional layer added to a pure perception; as such a perception cannot be separated from the determination; they are really *one* act. The object as such is *fitted* for the conceptualisation in its very *being*, as it is created in the very *same* manifestation as the potencies of language.

[153] p.246/25, Mudaliar: "*Sivajñānamāpādiyam* (1985)

The transformation from the ideal meaning in the pure *māyā* to the actual expression in language in the grossest form of impure māyā, is running through some intermediate stages: Subtle (*sūkṣma*), gross (*pasyanti*), impression (*madhyama*), and expression (*vaikhari*) [154].

It is because of this common ground in the initial creation of the pure *māyā*, and the perfect *symmetry* of cause and effects in the realms of pure and impure *māyā*, that there is a fundamental metaphysical togetherness of words and things, and that the activation of specific sounds has a both revealing and active impact on the world of object. As the revealing effect of words it is capable to remove the obstacle of cognising objects; as an *active* power capable of affecting the objects through the sound vibration, and having an impact on the state of both 'external' and 'internal' objects.

Thus it is said in *Sivajñānamāpādiyam*, in the commentary to ninth sūtra, statement three, that the utterance of the five holy syllables will purify the candidate if repeated and meditated upon. In this level it is the basic power of sound as the first *creational* power which is activated, while the utterance of words with a *definite* meaning is an ambiguous phenomenon as this meaning may be *obscured* in the process of cognition.

The Fall: Closing of Openness

Avidyā, ignorance, is not a simple case of erroneous knowledge, but a false identification which makes the self appear as *nothing*, and objects appear as the *exemplary* being in respect to which every other kind of being has to be measured, if it is to be true, in the sense: Scientifically correct. Now, how is this *alienation* in respect to being as such, and our own self, to be understood in the light of the previous interpretation of our being as openness?

What truly *is*, is seen as nothing, and that which do not possess genuine being (impermanence), is seen as the *only* existent form of being. This means a movement towards the closing of openness - and enforcing of ignorance. We are defined as individual selves in the state of bondage, and in this condition we communicate and have social relations; our openness is in these relations actualised in the world and in the language makes the selves subject to collective forces of ignorance, unfolding

[154] p.177, Mudaliar: "Sivajñānamāpādiyam (1985).

in the medium of language and actions. The might be in a state of openness, but mostly realised in the modus of ignorance which determines the selves in terms of *objects*: The possibility of openness is in the state of bondage seemingly replaced with objective *determinations*, and appears not to be anymore[155].

This movement within the structure of ignorance may be characterised as a *fall*. The fall is a metaphor signifying that aspect of existence which is conditioned by ignorance, and which is characterised by a movement in a limitless downward direction. As the self is caught up in ignorance, and exist in a fundamental openness, that is, is defined as being in a non-complete relation, then our state ignorance must be characterised as *without limit*. And because our being is dependent on a non-realised possibility (liberation), our understanding of our true aim is also modified as our sense of possibility is affected.

The inertia of *presence* as the priority of the *actual* as true makes it possible for the phenomenon of ignorance to modify every kind of knowledge, to the effect of a reflection in our cognitive faculties of the objective world; the aspect of *tamas* in this context may be said to be the domination of *facticity* (objectivity) over what makes the factual only a *stage* in the manifestation of the divine. The actual possibility of such a scenario may point to the success of sciences in the field of practical results. The immediate impact of such a success is felt in the division of what is considered as science and non-science (factual and non-factual). The power of the results of technical progress is exercised in dominance of the *actual* over the *possible*; the *immanent* over the *transcendent*; or that of *use* over the *awareness*.

This brings us back to where we began: At the feet of Socrates in the moment where he empties his portion of poison; at *that* moment the western philosophy had not begun its journey towards what it has become today. The metaphysics was not a science but speculation about the nature of reality, in what we might call 'in a sprit of openness'. This openness has now turned to the very opposite, as the progress of western philosophy is determined by the dispelling of metaphysics, embracing any suitable special sciences, and therefore subject to *fragmentation* and *purposelessness*. The effect of

[155] This appearance brought about by ignorance is beautifully described by Heidegger as a fall, in a chapter in his early work; p.114-180, §25-§38, Heidegger: "*Sein und Zeit*" (1967)

the metaphysically based ignorance and the persistent power of the root-impurity is displayed in an exemplary form in the state of western philosophy today.

Conclusion

This paper is build on the connection between questions and answers, in the sense that questions is the driving force behind knowledge; the priority of questions over answers means that in the questions a whole field is opened for possible answers, while the answer only represent one option from this range, though, of course questions is not created from a random or neutral standpoint, but is chosen from a wider range of possible questions, which repeats in a larger context the open field of possible questions, right up till we reach the field of being itself.

In this paper I have chosen to pose the question for the significance of Śaiva Siddhānta philosophy in the context of a western tradition: From within the science of metaphysics. As this is a characteristic western discipline rooted in the ancient Greece philosophy I chose to make my definitions explicit to gain the proper meaning of the subject of metaphysics.
Through the application of these definitions we arrived at an understanding of the concept of being; as pure being or being as such, and its modifications in the form of self, world, and its constituents, including the very root-cause of the world. As the self unfold its potentialities in the form of feelings, conation and cognition in the world, we examined the structure of the world as a result of manifestation of the potencies of the Primal Being.

In the course of this theme we discovered how being is reflected in the selves and the world. The exposition of these issues made us turn to the epistemology, as in this field we may find the genuine expression of being and its derivates, and most important a way to realise what is the aim of all Indian philosophies: Liberation of the sentient self from the insentient world.
In the epistemology we found the concept of consciousness, which is found in different forms according to different states including the corresponding fields of apprehensions (or non-apprehension). We discovered that the structure of empirical cognition itself pointed to a *transcendental* level of consciousness which supported the empirical functions, which in turn also pointed to a universal being as the necessary condition of liberation. This means that only in this *universal* being can we find a *real* constitution of empirical consciousness which lead us to transcend ourselves in the individualised state.

This led to a further investigation of the implication and nature of the world as that place which holds the signs pointing to that what lies beyond; that the world and the way we are reflects the possibility of intuitive and pervasive knowledge freed from the bonds of the world. This constituted our understanding of absolute knowledge and being, as something we *already* knows and reflects in the world, but which *mostly* is invisible covered the structure of ignorance, that is, the structure of our being in the world which have the ability to conceal transcendence behind the phenomenon of immanence.

This ability we found expressed in the implication of the objectifying activity: *Language*. Language was the place of the connection between ideal meaning and sensual expression which exhibit the creational level of pure and impure māyā, as in the coexistence of universal and limited consciousness. The priorities of actuality over possibility lead us to the characterisation of the mechanism of ignorance as a *fall*, given the actuality of the historical specific condition at the present state. In this connection it is noteworthy that the two different contexts of *individual* and *collective* aspects makes two different kind of understanding of ignorance possible.

From the question of ignorance we now arrive at the significant points in the course of reasoning and phenomenological descriptions. In accordance with the double intention of this paper, the Śaiva Siddhānta and the western perspective comprises a number of central statements dealing with seemingly incongruent realms, but still tied together by the concept of *metaphysical* ignorance:

1) The phenomenon of ignorance in the world is *not* of the nature of erroneous knowledge, but is an expression of a metaphysical state.

2) The feature in ignorance which makes liberation possible is found in the *pure apperception*, the self-consciousness which is aware of itself, and which is in an inseparable relation to the Primal Being.

3) The orientation in the world is structured as *language* as it expresses both the ideal and actual dimension of our situation, in pointing to both the world of forms and its source. This double function also accounts for the use of *mantras* as the means of countering the effects of ignorance.

5) The absence of metaphysic in western philosophy itself is *one example* of the actualisation of the metaphysical principle of ignorance stated in Śaiva Siddhānta.

These five statements are intimately connected to each other, as it is the concept of ignorance which is to be found in the concrete world, but which as metaphysical founded is a *coherent* phenomenon present *everywhere* in the world, in particular in the form of absence of reality in western philosophy. The notion of reality is something which has become only measurable in terms of our knowledge, most often based on a concept of an ego (idealistic or realistic) expressing the condition of a culture which is devoted to *function* and *affectivity* - and incompatible with the non-language of *awareness* which is bound to be drowned in the refinement of 'technical' language employed even in philosophical discourse.

The reason for references to the philosopher Emanuel Kant is in this context obvious: In his paradigmatic philosophy is defined a groundbreaking system with the purpose of establishing the *absence* of reality in contemporary western philosophy, and therefore it became important as performing the final dispel of metaphysics from philosophy. The subsequent definitions of reality in western philosophy after Kant was expressed in many different forms, but usually in terms of either *language*, individual *consciousness* or as structures of *social interaction*; all of them are different modifications of *one* idea: That we ourselves and the activities we perform are the measurement of everything that truly *is*.

Meykandadeva's *Śivajñānabodha* shows that metaphysics as referring to a universal realm which cannot and must not be commanded, is necessary, but even more important: It points to a *practical spirituality* which connects philosophy to both a moral and spiritual commitment without which philosophy cannot *be*. The lesson for western philosophy is to recognise the link between *moral*, *truth* and *being*; an insight which were the fruitful source of western philosophy in the beginning of time before it was reformed by Christianity and annihilated by the administrators of the commanding reality of modern technology – seemingly only fitting for that which accommodates the demands of *particular* way to be, that is, what is left of reality after the filtering operations of the self-constituted sciences.

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